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In this dissertation I will be reviewing a few much-cited theories from the fields of 
psychology and neurobiology concerning the building of autobiographical memories, of a 
sense of self and of narrative identity. I will then compare some of these theories and findings 
to what literary theorists have been saying for years about the matter of fiction vs. non-fiction 
in the genre of autobiography.  
 Philippe Lejeune's idea that autobiography is in essence a contractual genre will be 
central to my conclusion. I recognize the importance of his well-known "autobiographical 
pact", and I suggest that there is yet another pact involved in the reading and writing of 
autobiographical narratives; what I would like to call the "neurobiological pact".  
 Using Brazilian author Graciliano Ramos' autobiography Infância ("Childhood") as 
an example, I will try to show how the narrative found in autobiographies relate to what is 
know about the narrative constructions we all make in order to form a coherent life story and 
maintain a unified sense of self. Steering my argumentation is the idea that autobiography 
does not "feel to the reader precisely like fiction" and that the critical pushing of 
autobiography into the realm of fiction does not agree with the fundamental human 
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1 Introduction  
 
"If there is a consensus is that there is no consensus about what 
 autobiography looks like or does" (Broughton 2007, p. 40) 
 
Much has been said about the literary genre of autobiography. Should it even be viewed as a 
genre? Throughout the years, many attempts have been made in order to establish a working 
definition or to decide whether to place autobiographies in the category of fiction or non-
fiction.  
 As Paul John Eakin (1992, p. 29) notes, since the 1970s "the pervasive initiative has 
been to establish autobiography as an imaginary art, with special emphasis on its fictions", 
and I will show that, even today, the idea that autobiographies are closer to fiction than to 
non-fiction remains current. Current, but not accepted at face value. Some literary theorists 
have picked up on people's "intuitive notion that autobiographies do not feel ... precisely like 
fiction" (ibid., p. 30).    Eakin (2008, p. 79) has suggested that one of the main characteristics of 
autobiography is that it mirrors not external reality, but the "neurobiological rhythms of 
consciousness", and has taken interest in the experience of the reader of autobiography. 
Distancing myself from claims that autobiographies, like novels, belong to the realm of 
fiction, I would like to propose that precisely because the form in autobiography is similar to 
the inner workings of the human mind when it comes to the formation of the self-narrative, 
we as readers are willing to distinguish it from more unconstrained modes of writing.  
 The making of this distiction may be aided by Philippe Leujeune's autobiographical 
pact. Lejeune defined autobiography as a "retrospective prose narrative written by a real 
person concerning his own existence" and proposed that author, narrator and protagonist had 
to be identical, using the proper name of the author as reference (Lejeune, 1973, p. 298). I 
view the proper name, the "real person" that Lejeune speaks of, as implying the existence of a 
physical body that has existed in the world and possesses a system of autobiographical 
knowledge. I argue that the pact (as well as any genre definition) serves mostly as an 
invitation to draw boundaries between the fictional and the non-fictional in the text. 
Ultimately, however, we will always distinguish created from remembered, and use our own 
experience of being a self with a set of memories and a "life story" to develop a sense of 
whether a given text is autobiographical or fictional.  
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 I will attempt to show how the narrative in Graciliano Ramos' Infância relates to what 
is known about the narrative constructions we all make in order to form a coherent life story 
and a unified sense of self; in other words, that the non-fictional character of the text comes 
from a biologically bound form of truth which resonates with the reader.  
 As human beings we all have a sense of a unified self, we have memories which feel 
true and can be very vivid, and we have feelings of ownership and agency toward the events 
of our own life. I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the distinctions we all make 
between "me" and "others" in order to try to explain why this autobiography does not feel 
precisely like fiction to its readers. 
 
3 
2 Truth in autobiography 
 
2.1 Does truth still matter? 
Although it sounds like a reasonable assumption that one can never expect autobiographies to 
faithfully replicate events as they happened in the past, recent works on autobiography 
suggest that the discussion around truth and reality in the genre is still very much alive.  
 In the second edition of their book Reading Autobiography, published in 2010 (p. 15), 
Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson write that "In trying to differentiate autobiographical 
narrative from biography, the novel, and history writing, we encounter a fundamental 
question: what is the truth status of autobiographical disclosure? How do we know whether 
and when a narrator is telling the truth or lying?". They proceed to answer the question by 
saying that the truth of the narrative is undecidable in life writing and that we need to "adjust 
our expectations of the truth" when reading autobiographical texts (ibid., p. 16), i.e. we 
should approach them not as texts with a stable truth which needs to be verified, but as a 
process of exchange between writer and reader, resulting in different interpretations of a 
particular life. 
 Only a few years earlier, Mark Freeman (2003, p. 120) had also written about the 
need to rethink the terms reality and fiction, truth and falsity, accuracy and distortion  in 
autobiography. One of the main characteristics of autobiographical writing is that the author 
is constantly looking at the rearview mirror. As Kate Douglas (2010, p. 21) puts it, "memory 
drives autobiography". Memory's fallibility is an important element in Freeman's 
argumentation. He quotes, among others, D. L. Schacter, who writes that the "output of 
human memory often differs—sometimes rather substantially—from the input. Remembering 
can fail not only because information is forgotten over time, but also because it is changed 
and distorted." (Freeman, 2003, p. 119). In autobiography, the author remembers and 
narrates, which means "situating experiences of the past ... in accordance with and in relation 
to what has happened since, as understood and reunderstood from ... the moment of 
narration" (ibid., p. 123). But the constructed, Freeman argues, is not necessarily untrue. In 
autobiographical writing, the concept of truth is more complicated than the fiction/reality 
dichotomy tends to convey, he continues, and we need to "think beyond it" (ibid., p. 127). 
 What Freeman suggests is that we look for another kind of truth by focusing on 
narrative time instead of clock time. By narrative time he means the kind of time which is in 
4 
our minds when we look back on past events. When we are thinking about these past events, 
we are adding a new dimension to them. Drawing on Hacking's work1, he argues that truth 
can also be the kind of truth "that is made available by narrative and by the poetic processes 
that go into the telling of the past" (ibid., p. 126). 
 Another scholar who has written extensively about truth in autobiography is Paul 
John Eakin. He writes that "[i]n the age of poststructuralism we have been too ready to 
assume that the very idea of a referential aesthethic is untenable, but autobiography is nothing 
if not a referential art" (Eakin, 1992, p. 28).  Eakin does not deny the reconstructive nature of 
autobiographical writing, but he still thinks that there is an important line to be drawn 
between fictional and non-fictional genres, especially because, as he notes, autobiographies 
"do not feel to the reader precisely like fiction" (Loesberg, in ibid., p. 30).  
 Referring to Lejeune and Bruss, Eakin also notes that "the most successful attempts to 
date to establish a poetics of the genre ... focus precisely on the reader's recognition of a 
referential intention in such texts and its consequences for their reception" (ibid., p. 29). In 
other words, the focus when dealing with autobiography can be turned away from the 
author's often obscure intention and from the evasive reality of the here and now, and toward 
the reader's inclination to separate the imagined from the factual. 
  
2.2 Autobiographical hoaxes 
Lejeune's idea of an "autobiographical pact" is very often cited in theoretical works on the 
genre. The pact supposes that the author, the narrator and the protagonist share the same 
name, and focuses not on historical accuracy, but on a sincere effort to tell the truth about the 
past. Lejeune himself, however, has later added that the "contract" in an autobiographical text 
implies "the possibility of some kind of verification" (Lejeune, 1991, p. 3).  
 More recent theories, such as Tonya Blowers', deal with the same issue, but seem to 
focus more on the way we read autobiography. Blowers has suggested that autobiographies 
can be read as textual contracts: "[R]eading the signature that is common to author, narrator 
and protagonist, knowing that it implies a specific mode of reading: autobiography, not 
fiction" (Blowers, 2000, p. 115), which is to say that there is a simultaneous acceptance of the 
reality outside the text as well as of the text's representative nature.  
 Also echoing Lejeune's pact, Smith and Watson (2010, p. 37) write that readers                                                         1 Hacking, I. 1995, Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the new sciences of memory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 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ascribe memories and experiences in self-referential writing "to a flesh-and-blood person", 
the author named on the cover, and "assume that the publication acts as an ethical guarantee 
by publishers and agents", accepting a certain amount of inconsistencies, but not, as they call 
it, "intentional duping"2.  
 In autobiography, then, the element of fiction can come about because of at least two 
factors. Aspects of one's life can be fictionalized (a) because, as Nabokov (1989, ch. 1-1) 
once wrote, memory is only afforded "a slippery hold" in consciousness. Even when the 
author tries to remember things correctly or sincerely believes he/she is remembering them 
correctly, there is still a reasonable chance that some of it will be distorted or even entirely 
fabricated; or (b) on purpose, as with so-called "autobiographical hoaxes". 
 Autobiographical hoaxes are breaches of the "textual contract", when an 
autobiography contains exaggerations, impersonations, plagiarism, fabrications, false 
witnessing and so on, and when these are used with intention by the author.  A recent and 
widely cited example of autobiographical hoax is James Frey's A Million Little Pieces, a book 
which garnered attention after it became a part of Oprah Winfrey's Book Club in 2005. Frey 
was later accused of fabricating, embellishing and manipulating details of his alleged 
experience with drugs, alcohol and crime.3 What followed was stir and outrage in the media 
and among readers (for other cases in which issues of trust in autobiographical narrative have 
been brought up, see Smith and Watson, 2010, pp. 34-35).   
 Eakin uses the controversy surrounding Frey's book as an example of how the 
referential character of autobiography still matters to readers: "What the Frey episode 
confirms", he writes, "is that the reception of memoir is contractual: readers expect 
autobiographers to exhibit some basic respect for the truth of their lives—break that trust and 
suffer the consequences" (Eakin, 2008, p. 20).  
 Eakin's view is shared, more recently, by Swirski (2010, p. 74), who states that "it 
does matter whether what we read is fiction or not. We do care whether we are hoaxed into 
believing that what we read is truth or make-believe". Swirski has also noticed that the 
distinction between fiction and non-fiction is still of utter importance to any work's identity: 
"Without it we would find ourselves in the midst of conceptual anarchy with no grounds to 
tell Conan Doyle's The Sign of Four from Eco's The Sign of Three" (ibid., p. 69).                                                          2 I should note that Smith and Watson (2010, p. 15) characterize Lejeune's concept of the autobiographical pact as "fractured".  3 See for instance The Smoking Gun's article "A Million Little Lies", from January 2006, found online at [http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/celebrity/million‐little‐lies] 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 Steven Pinker has tried to explain this distinction between fiction and non-fiction that 
Swirski speaks of. He writes that even though people can "lose themselves in fiction, or 
misremember something ..., or mistakenly believe that a stylized portrayal of a time and a 
place is an accurate portrayal", all of us can distinguish fictitious worlds from real ones, "as 
we see when a two-year old pretends that a banana is a telephone for the fun of it but at the 
same time understands that a banana is not literally a telephone" (Pinker, 2002, p. 215). This 
last example serves simply to stress the fact that even though the line between reality and 
fiction has been blurred by theory in the past couple of decades, as human beings we have 
always distinguished (and probably always will) between the two. 
 What I take from Pinker, Eakin and Swirski is that there may be no "Great Divide" 
between fact and fiction in literary works (to use the same expression Darrel Mansell used in 
1976), and still it seems like the mind always seeks to distinguish between these two modes, 
both in the act of writing and in the act of reading. 
 
2.3 A "hopelessly inventive" genre 
When it comes to autobiographical hoaxes, there is in most cases an intention to deceive, but 
the question of truth in autobiography is naturally also problematic even when the author has 
the best intentions at heart. Gazzaniga addresses the issue indirectly in The Mind's Past: 
 
... The interpreter, the last device in the information chain in our brain, reconstructs the brain events 
and in doing so makes telling errors of perception, memory, and judgement. The clue to how we are 
built is buried not just under our marvelously robust capacity for these functions, but also in the errors 
that are frequently made during reconstruction. Biography is fiction. Autobiography is hopeslessly 
inventive. (1998, pp. 1-2) 
 
What he does is to point out that our minds can be deceiving. Our brains can make mistakes, 
both in the act of perception and when recalling past events.  
 Almost a century before Gazzaniga, in 1907, Georg Misch already thought of 
autobiography as a genre which "of necessity must be regarded with scepticism" (in 
Broughton, 2007, p. 69):  
 
It is an admitted psychological fact that remembrance does not proceed as mechanical reproduction but 
tends to creation. Hence autobiographies are not to be regarded as objective narratives. To regard them 




Much like Freeman does many years later, Georges Gusdorf, another important critic, 
considered autobiography to be in fact truer than experience, because the first is a second 
reading of the latter. It is in fact interesting to see that Gusdorf expressed over fifty years ago 
the same concern as Freeman, Smith, Watson, Eakin and many of our contemporary scholars: 
namely, the need to seek the significance of autobiography "beyond truth and falsity" 
(Gusdorf, 1956, p. 89): 
 
The past that is recalled has lost its flesh and bone solidity, but it has won a new and more intimate 
relationship to the individual life that can thus, after being long dispersed and sought again throughout 
the course of time, be rediscovered and drawn together again beyond time.  (ibid., p. 85)  
 
In addition to the reconstructive character of memory, there has also been a shift in the past 
decades in the way the self is regarded. While it was first thought of as universal and unified, 
the self is now known to be fragmented and fluid, an illusion of sorts (this will be explained 
more in depth in the next chapter). "As a result," Smith and Watson (2010, p. 201) point out, 
"the project of self-representation could no longer be read as providing direct access to the 
truth of the self. Truthfulness becomes a more complex phenomenon of narrators struggling 
to shape an 'identity' out of an amorphous subjectivity."  
 
We understand by now that autobiography, like the act of remembering, will inevitably be a 
reconstruction of events. But although it may not always faithfully replicate immediate 
experience, it is not necessarily a distortion of reality or something simply imagined. As a 
genre, autobiography is still very much under scrutiny, perhaps (unfairly) more so than the 
novel. According to Broughton (2007, p. 37), "many contemporary theorists insist [that] 
autobiography is intrinsically a hybrid form, containing within it traces of other forms". As 
far as I´m aware, virtually any literary genre can be said to do that, including (and especially) 
the novel.  
 Autobiography's non-fictional character has constantly been questioned throughout 
the genre's history, due to the fact that there will always be some element of fiction in 
autobiographical texts. As Damasio (2010, p. 149) explains, however, "the process of 
imagination ... consists of the recall of images and their subsequent manipulation—cutting, 
enlarging, reordering, and so forth." This makes me wonder whether the common relegation 
of autobiographies to the status of "mere fictions", to borrow Freeman's words (2003, p. 115), 
is in itself a conception that ultimately could be turned on its head.  
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 What Damasio's description of imaginative thinking suggests is that fiction may also 
contain autobiographical elements (and it usually and inevitably does). This doesn't seem to 
bother us much—we accept fictional narratives as made-up stories that may include non-
fictional elements to a certain extent. And it is not uncommon for readers to look for elements 
of the author's autobiography in works that have been labeled fiction.  
 An interesting case in Norway is that of Karl Ove Knausgård and his Min Kamp4 
(2009-2011). Since it was made explicit that the work was highly autobiographical, even 
though it was characterized as a novel, many went looking for connections between the text 
and the outside world. The fact that a large part of Knausgård's account is based on memory 
like any other autobiography, and consequently of reconstructive nature, didn't seem to stop 
readers from seeking verification. 
 My point is that although the knowledge we now have about how the mind works ties 
fiction and non-fiction closer and closer together, as readers we seem to insist on tearing 
them apart again. 
 
2.4 So what kind of truth do we find in autobiography? 
In spite of all the doubts raised about the possibility of recalling the past as it happened and 
of finding a stable and objective truth for the self, no one has yet managed to put an end to 
the discussion about how to distinguish between reality and fiction in self-writing. To suggest 
that autobiography may in the end be pure fiction does not seem to agree with our own 
feelings of having a life story and our knowledge of who we are as individuals. At the same 
time, it is undeniable that the terms reality and truth are problematic when the subject looks 
back and tries to put together bits and pieces of his/her own past.  
 In a chapter named The Elusiveness of Truth, Roy Pascal asked himself a question 
which I believe is still valid: "Are we then to conclude that truth does not matter overmuch in 
autobiography?" (1960, p. 83). Perhaps Paul de Man was right when he concluded (1979, p. 
921) that "the distinction between fiction and autobiography is not an either/or polarity ... it is 
undecidable". Yet, the fact that autobiography still survives as a genre and that many of us 
don't seem to feel comfortable calling it fiction, leaves room for inquiry.  
 When reading autobiographies there is, in my opinion, an acceptance of the fact that 
"memory and imagination conspire" (Eakin, 2008, p. 63) to allow the author to portray the                                                         4 My Struggle 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reality (or should we say the illusion) of the self. In Eakin's words, "we tolerate a huge 
amount of fiction these days in works we accept nonetheless as somehow factual accounts of 
their author’s lives" (ibid.). If one accepts this idea, autobiographical reality becomes 
something other than physical reality, while still remaining something to which the term 
"fiction" does not satisfactorily apply. 
 Nonetheless, it does seem like an endless debate: fiction is not always purely 
fictional; non-fiction may never be truly referential; memories can be deceiving, the self is 
most likely an illusion and consciousness is an entirely private phenomenon. Yet I believe, as 
Pascal does, that truth is and should be an important aspect of autobiography: "Not only does 
the reader expect truth from autobiography, but autobiographers themselves all make more or 
less successful efforts to get at the truth, to stick to it, or at least to try to persuade us that they 
are doing so" (Pascal, 1960, p. 83). 
 The question remains: what kind of truth and what kind of reality is autobiography 
referential to? And why do we refuse to place it in the same category as fiction? 
 I will be choosing to focus on recollections from childhood to try to give one possible 
answer to this question. As Roy Pascal notes (ibid., p. 71), autobiographical narratives which 
attempt to reconstruct childhood are based almost solely on memory (and very distant 
memories, for that matter), meaning that the line between fiction and non-fiction is extremely 
blurry. They also present facts that are often hard or sometimes impossible to verify, both for 
the readers and for the authors themselves, which is why I believe a childhood autobiography 
will be a suitable source for illustration purposes. 
 More specifically, I will be using Brazilian author Graciliano Ramos' autobiography 
Infância5, which was first published in 1945 and follows the first eleven years of the author's 
life.  
 In the book, Ramos shows signs of being extremely aware of the difficulty in 
recalling a distant past, and he offers the reader insight not only into the output of his 
memories, but also into the process of recalling them. Take for instance this passage from the 
chapter "Summer": 
 
Deste antigo verão que me alterou a vida restam ligeiros traços apenas. E nem dêles posso afirmar que 
efetivamente me recorde. O hábito me leva a criar um ambiente, imaginar fatos a que atribuo realidade. 
(...) Certas coisas existem por derivação e associação; repetem-se, impõe-se — e, em letra de fôrma, 
tomam consistência, ganham raízes. Dificilmente pintaríamos um verão nordestino em que os ramos                                                         5 Childhood 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não estivessem prêtos e as cacimbas vazias. Reunimos elementos considerados indispensáveis, 
jogamos com êles, e se desprezamos alguns, o quadro parece incompleto (Ramos, 1969, pp. 40-41).6 
 
In the case of Infância, the author identified the work as autobiographical. In an interview 
published in 1948, Ramos was asked to talk about his first years of life in the Northeast of 
Brazil. His answer was "All this has already been told in Childhood. Is it worth repeating?" 
(my translation; in Silva, 2004, p. 27).  
 Furthermore, the text was first published in a collection entitled Memórias, Diários, 
Confissões7 and at the time it was described in the newspapers as the story of author 
Graciliano Ramos' life (see ibid., pp. 31-32).  
 It seems, therefore, that the autobiographical pact in Infância has been sealed. Despite 
the fact that some critics have later attempted to label it an autobiographical novel, mostly 
because of stylistic elements in the narrative which are characteristic of fiction writing 
(change of perspective, for instance), the book is still treated as the author's account of his 
childhood years. But is it only because of the "contract" established between author and 
reader that Ramos' autobiography is not read as fiction? 
 In the following chapter, I will explain how some of those who study the phenomenon 
of consciousness, such as neurologists Antonio Damasio and Oliver Sacks, psychologist 
Bruce Hood and philosopher John R. Searle, view the self, and why the self is characterized 
as an illusion by many of today's scholars. Next, I will be looking closely at how 
autobiographical memory is built, a process which can not even begin before the sense of 
self—both as agent and subject—is in place, and at the role of this Self Memory System in 
the life story narrative that each of us constructs. I will attempt to show how the processes 
I've just mentioned manifest themselves in the literary genre of autobiography by using 






3 Consciousness and the self 
 
In chapter 2, I quoted Eakin as saying that "the most successful attempts to date to establish a 
poetics of the genre [of autobiography] ... focus precisely on the reader's recognition of a 
referential intention in such texts and its consequences for their reception" (1992, p. 29). As 
readers, you and I understand that there may be parts of a text that are created in imagination, 
and others that attempt to be loyal to mundane experience. Why then do we, in the act of 
reading, never let go of the distinction between fiction and non-fiction?  
 Authors too continue to write both fictional and non-fictional texts, and I think any 
author would say that the process of writing a novel and the process of writing an 
autobiography are essentially not the same. Why does autobiography as a distinct literary 
genre still survives, in spite of critics and scholars time and time again emphasizing that "the 
autobiographical act is inevitably creative, its realities ineluctably unreal", as Elizabeth Bruss 
(1976, p. 140) once wrote?  
 My approach in this chapter will be to examine some of the self's biological roots and 
attempt to draw a few parallels between our inherent sense of self and autobiography as a 
literary genre. Using Eakin's idea of autobiography mirroring not external reality, but the 
"neurobiological rhythms of consciousness" (Eakin, 2008, p. 79) as a starting point, I would 
like to explore the idea that, precisely because in our minds we have a sense of self with a life 
story, and because autobiography is an attempt to project this sense of self in some form, we 
as readers (and as writers) are willing to distinguish it from more unconstrained modes of 
fiction.  
 
3.1 The self illusion 
Although, as Lynch (2010, p. 209) tells us, autobiography "is arguably the most underhand of 
all literary genres, consistently avoiding the definitions fashioned for it and eluding the genre 
boundaries expected of it", one characteristic has rarely been contested: memory and the self 
lie at the heart of autobiographical writing.  
 Memory plays a vital role in the existence of our sense of self. As Searle (2004, p. 
198) writes, "My sense that I am the same person over time, from my first-person point of 
view, is in a large part a matter of my ability to produce conscious memories of earlier 
conscious events in my life".   
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 We all have an idea of what memory is: the ability to retain and recall or revive facts, 
people, previous experiences and other elements of our lives. But "What is the self?" is 
significantly more difficult to answer. Indeed, part of the reason why autobiography as a 
genre has been called into question is the conundrum of the self and its construction: 
"[A]utobiography is perceived to be as ineffable and irreducible as the self it figures", 
Anderson (2011, p. 5) writes.  
 There are so many worthy theories about consciousness and self that even a 
superficial survey of the most important ones would be out of the scope of this text. I have 
therefore chosen to focus on a few of the most recent works from scholars who explore the 
subject of the self specifically.  
 Bruce Hood is one of these scholars, and he questions the existence of a unified self. 
He refers to the self as an illusion, his view being that the story of our selves is "a constructed 
narrative that our brain creates" (2012, p. xiii). He presents a number of psychological studies 
which to him undermine the notion of a singular self: 
 
If we are so susceptible to group pressure, subtle priming cues, stereotyping, and cultural cuing, then 
the notion of a true, unyielding ego self cannot be sustained. If it is a self that flinches and bends with 
tiny changes in circumstances, then it might as well be nonexistent. (ibid., pp. 218-219) 
 
Here Hood is stressing, among other things, that the self is shaped by context, by culture and 
by the reflected opinion of those around us through social interaction (as many have pointed 
out before him). More interestingly, he also explains that there is no center in the brain where 
the self is constructed: "...the self illusion is really a culmination of a multitude of processes. 
These usually work together in synchrony to produce a unified self" (ibid., p. 233). Another 
scholar who defends this view is V.S. Ramachandran. In The Tell-Tale Brain (2011, p. 247), 
he says that the self is not the "monolithic entity it believes itself to be" and that the notion of 
a unitary self "may as well be an illusion". 








                                                                    Figure 1.  A copy of Bruce Hood's demonstration of the self illusion (Hood, 2012, p. 293). 
 
As he explains, the brain helps us "see" the invisible circle that represents the self, but the 
circle, like the self, is an illusion that emerges from external influences. It is a result of the 
brain's attempts to "organize, interpret and fill in missing information based on past 
experience" (Hood, 2012, pp. 293-294).  
 Hood brings attention to how neurons communicate with each other and to the fact 
that everything we experience is processed into patterns of neural activity that form our 
mental life. These patterns (ibid., pp. 10-11) encode information such as memories, plans, 
knowledge of the world, feelings, et cetera. "Everything we are, can do, and will do is 
nothing more than this. Otherwise, we would need ghosts in the brain and, so far, none have 
been found", he concludes (ibid.). 
 Hood argues that the brain creates a model for the self in order to handle all the 
experiences that we are bombarded by every second of every day. This sounds similar to 
Daniel Dennett's suggestion that "of all the things in the environment an active body must 
make mental models of, none is more crucial than the model the agent has of itself" (Dennett, 
1991, p. 427).  
 Dennett touches the subject of the self illusion by means of a termite colony 
metaphor:           
         
So wonderful is the organization of a termite colony that it seemed to some observers that each termite 
colony had to have a soul.... We now understand that its organization is simply the result of a million 
semi-independent little agents, each itself an automaton, doing its thing. (ibid., p. 416) 
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Like the termite colony, the human self is organized in such a way that it is easy to believe 
that we have a soul, some distinct entity running the show, "a benevolent Dictator ruling from 
Headquarters", as Dennett puts it (ibid.).  
 Fundamental to Dennett's theory is the role of language in human development. He 
emphasizes the fact that we human beings must constantly represent ourselves both to 
ourselves and to others, and we do this by means of story-telling. You and I entertain the 
illusion that our self-narratives come from a single source, ourselves: the "center of narrative 
gravity" (ibid, p. 418). The self, according to Dennett, is an abstraction concocted from "the 
myriads of attributions and interpretations (including self-attributions and self-
interpretations) that have composed the biography of the living body whose Center of 
Narrative it is" (ibid., pp. 426-427).  
 Similarly, Hood states that the brain creates a somewhat coherent story based on our 
experiences and remarks that the self is what pulls all the elements in our narrative together 
(Hood, 2012, p. 290). Indeed, as neurologist Oliver Sacks (1987, pp.110-111) has noted, "... 
each of us is a biography, a story. Each of us is a singular narrative, which is constructed, 
continually, unconsciously, by, through, and in us—through our perceptions, our feelings, our 
thoughts, our actions; and, not least, our discourse, our spoken narrations" (his italics). 
 
3.2 Three levels of the self 
Another interesting and much-cited scholar who explores in depth the subject of 
consciousness and the self, is neurologist Antonio Damasio. His definition is that the self 
introduces a subjective perspective in the mind, allowing the mind to be fully conscious, as 
he explained during a TED speech recently (Damasio, 2011). To be conscious, one needs to 
be awake and to have an operational mind, as well as a sense of self. The self is not a thing, 
he reminds us, it is a dynamic process, "and the process is present at all times when we are 
presumed to be conscious" (Damasio, 2010, p. 7). In other words, the self is the protagonist 
of our mental events. 
 Damasio identifies different levels of the self: a so-called proto-self which we are not 
conscious of, an ever-changing core self and the more advanced autobiographical self, from 
which our senses of identity and personhood arise. The two last types of self, core and 
autobiographical, correspond to two types of consciousness: core consciousness and extended 
consciousness. In core consciousness, the organism has a sense of self in one moment, now, 
and one place, here (Damasio, 1999, p. 16). In extended consciousness, we find a more 
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elaborate sense of self, as we are aware of our past, we anticipate our future and we have 
knowledge of the world around us. (ibid.).  
 The main characteristic of core consciousness is what Damasio calls "the very feeling 
of you" (ibid., p. 127). In core consciousness, the me is formed, which is an aggregate of the 
following elements: perspective, ownership, agency and primordial feelings. As he explains, 
"perspective" refers to a standpoint, which is the body; "ownership" is the feeling that objects 
are being represented in a mind that belongs to me; "agency" refers to the feeling that my 
mind commands the actions of my body, and "primordial feelings" are the most basic kinds 
of feelings and reflect the state of the living body, signifying its existence "independently of 
how objects engage it or not" (primordial feelings are generated on the level of the protoself; 
Damasio, 2010, p. 185). These are said to be ingredients of a self in its most simple version. 
To quote Damasio (ibid.): "The simple self at the bottom of the mind is a lot like music, but 
not yet like poetry".  
 The core self unfolds when the organism interacts with an object. It is formed by "a 
sequence of images that depict an object engaging the protoself and modifying that protoself, 
including its primordial feelings" (ibid., p. 22). Finally, there is the autobiographical self, in 
which we find our biographical knowledge of the past and anticipated future, knowledge 
about ourselves, our lives and the world we live in. Those images generate pulses of core self, 
and this aggregate of pulses in turn constitutes an autobiographical self (ibid.). By "pulses", 
Damasio means "singular units of consciousness occurring one after the other". This happens 
with such small intervals and so many at the same time, that we "only register a continuous, 
whirring blur" (Damasio, 1999, p. 346n4).  
 
The more advanced autobiographical self, which is part of extended consciousness, can only 
be constructed by means of the core self mechanism: 
In brains endowed with abundant memory, language, and reasoning, narratives with this same simple 
origin and contour are enriched and allowed to display even more knowledge, thus producing a well-
defined protagonist, an autobiographical self. (Damasio, 2010, pp. 203-204). 
 
For Damasio, it is in the core self of the here and now that the individual has a sense of 
personhood, but not the complexity of what we associate with identity (ibid., p. 168). The 
part of our consciousness linked to both personhood and identity is, according to Damasio, 
extended consciousness.  
 In a review of Gerald Edelman's Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind, 
Oliver Sacks also writes about the difference between what he calls primary and higher-order 
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consciousness: "[Higher-order consciousness] is dependent on the evolutionary development 
of language, along with the evolution of symbols, of cultural exchange; and with all this 
brings an unprecedented power of detachment, generalization, and reflection" (Sacks, 1993, 
p. 3). From higher-order consciousness, self-consciousness arises, giving us the ability to 
reflect and introspect, and to be shaped by culture and history. 
 In his review, Sacks points out that higher-order consciousness arises from and 
supplements primary consciouness. Likewise, Damasio explains that extended consciousness 
depends on the "core you", and that it places the experiences of the core you in a much bigger 
context, connecting them to the lived past and anticipated future of the person's 
autobiographical record (Damasio, 1999, p. 196). Like the objects that interact with the core 
self, autobiographical memories are objects and therefore also able to generate pulses of core 
consciousness and a "sense of self knowing" (ibid., p. 197). As Damasio explains, core 
consciousness operates along an interval no longer than the fraction of a second, while 
extended consciousness can stretch from seconds and minutes to hours and years.  
 Summing up, then: "Extended consciousness is ... the capacity to be aware of a large 
compass of entities and events, i.e., the ability to generate a sense of individual perspective, 
ownership, and agency, over a larger compass of knowledge than that surveyed in core 
consciousness" (ibid., p. 198).  
 One difference between Damasio's description of the processes which give rise to the 
self in its different stages, and the vision of the self described in the previous section, is the 
emphasis on language. While Hood and Dennett place considerable weight on the social 
interactions and narrative processes that go into forming the brain's model for the self, 
Damasio proposes that even autobiographical selves do not require the advanced language 
system that humans possess (it is not unthinkable that chimpanzees and dogs also have them 
in some form, he adds). But due to an "ample endowment of memory, reasoning ability, and 
that critical gift called language" (ibid.), human beings are able to develop a more complex 
sense of personhood.  
 These theories seem to converge, however, when Damasio suggests that the building 
of the autobiographical self, i.e. the image of ourselves developed during the course of a 
lifetime, occurs to a great extent unconsciously. Also, Damasio recognizes that "we can vary 
and waver, succumb to vanity and betray, be malleable and voluble. The potential to create 
our own Hamlets, Iagos, and Falstaffs is inside each of us" (ibid., p. 225).   
 It seems reasonable to say that the autobiographical self that Damasio speaks of, is the 
very subject of self-writing—which implies (and I will come back to this later) that the self 
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portrayed in the literary genre of autobiography may also be thought of as having deeper 
roots, since experiences must be registered in core consciousness before they can become 
records that in turn can be reactivated in extended consciousness. The protoself and the core 
self are, as Damasio suggests, "the first basis for the conscious you" (his italics; ibid., p. 172): 
You rise above the sea level of knowing, transiently but incessantly, as a felt core self, renewed again 
and again, thanks to anything that comes from outside the brain into its sensory machinery or anything 
that comes from the brain's memory stores toward sensory, motor, or autonomic recall. You know it is 
you seeing because the story depicts a character—you—doing the seeing. (ibid.) 
 
Although Dennett, Hood and Damasio seem to have each their own suggestion of how a self 
is formed and maintained in our minds, their theories are not entirely incongruent. The 
difference is that the first two seem to be mainly concerned with self and conciousness as 
post-language phenomena, which would correspond to what Damasio refers to as extended 
consciousness.  
 As I will explain shortly, I believe that many literary theories of autobiography draw 
their conclusions from the notion of the self as it manifests itself in extended consciousness, 
giving less attention (or often none at all) to the more basic core consciousness. Perhaps this 
is why autobiography is sometimes thought of as fiction, as Freeman argues (2003, p. 115), 
just as the self turns out to be an illusion.  
 Although I do not completely disagree with this view, I would like to explore (a) the 
role of foundational core consciousness, (b) the processes that go into the construction of the 
post-language autobiographical self, and how (a) and (b) may relate to the way we read and 
write autobiography.  
 
3.3 A necessary illusion 
Taking into account the notion of the self as an illusion, it would be naïve to suggest that 
there is such thing as one subject to be discovered in any autobiography. Especially with the 
knowledge we now have of how the brain works (a small fraction of which has been 
described here), it would be something like believing in a homunculus in our minds or a 
ghost in the machine. Still, the autobiographical subject, as multifaceted and elusive as it may 
be, feels like a real story in our minds. The idea that the self is an illusion does not mean that 
we don't have a sense of self as unified. This is a point made by all scholars of consciousness 
that I have mentioned so far. 
18 
 Damasio (2010, p. 170) reminds us that "even at its most subtle and faint, the self is a 
necessary presence in the mind". It is also a real presence. Whether or not the self is an 
illusion, it is a necessary illusion, the lack of which would cause the mind to "lose its 
orientation, the ability to gather its parts", as Damasio explains.8 The unified self may also be 
a necessity from an evolutionary standpoint:  
The tendency toward unified control prevails during our developmental history, probably because a 
single organism requires that there be one single self if the job of maintaining life is to be accomplished 
successfully–more than one self per organism is not a good recipe for survival (Damasio, 1999, p. 225).  
 
Although Bruce Hood, as previously explained, defends the idea of the self as an illusion, 
something constructed and susceptible to change, he does not deny the fact that there is a 
unified self at some level, the "essential self" that he dissects (Hood, 2012, p. 112). He writes 
that "[w]e think of our self as travelling a path in time from childhood to adulthood, 
punctuated by life events and the people along the way who have influenced us and shaped 
who we are" (ibid, p. 71). And, like Damasio, Hood acknowledges that the self is a necessity, 
as we can read in the following passage: 
If you think about the "I" and the "me" that we usually refer to as the self, it provides a focal point to hang 
experiences together both in the immediate here and now, as well as to join those events over a lifetime. 
Experiences are fragmented episodes unless they are woven together in a meaningful narrative. (ibid., p. 
290) 
Ramachandran, who also defends the idea of self as an illusion, describes nonetheless unity 
and continuity as two of seven important aspects of the self (2011, pp. 250-251; the other five 
aspects being embodiment, privacy, social embedding, free will and self-awareness).  
 Ramachandran notes that the diversity of sensory experiences that we have does not 
stop us from feeling like one person, and that despite the fact that we have many (often 
contradictory) goals, memories, emotions, actions and so on, these still seem to be part of a 
single individual. This is what he means by "unity". By "continuity", he means that we have a 
sense of continuity of identity through time, as well as an ability, in our minds, to "travel" 
back to our past or project ourselves into our future.  
 
Another significant element to consider when talking about the self as we experience it in our 
minds, is the importance of the body. After all, the one indisputable and unifying element of 
our existence (and perhaps the easiest to acknowledge, since it is a physical given) is the 
body. It is embodied that we travel from childhood to adulthood, and the death of our body                                                         8 In the 1960's, British psychiatrist Ronald David Laing referred to mental disease (schizophrenia, mainly) as a "divided self". 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marks the end of our life story. This idea is described by philosopher John R. Searle (2004, p. 
196) as spatio-temporal continuity of the body, because the body I inhabit today is spatio-
temporally continuous with the body of the infant from when I was born. This characteristic 
is, according to Searle, one of the criteria of personal identity. "Embodiment" is, as 
mentioned, one of Ramachandran's seven key aspects of the self. The term refers precisely to 
the feeling that we are "anchored and at home" in our bodies (ibid., p. 251). 
   
Damasio also points out that the body is the foundation of the conscious mind. "Although the 
body is the thing mapped," he writes (Damasio, 2010, p. 89), "it never loses contact with the 
mapping entity, the brain. Under normal circumstances they are hitched to each other from 
birth to death". 
 It should clear by now that much of our sense of self is related to the body. "For every 
person you know, there is a body", Damasio writes (1999, p. 142), "you may never have 
given any thought to this simple relationship but there it is: one person, one body; one mind, 
one body". Two of the most important concepts Damasio associates with the self are 
ownership and agency, both of which are said to be rooted in the body: 
 
Ownership and agency are ... entirely related to a body at a particular instant and in a particular space. 
The things you own are close to your body, or should be, so that they remain yours, and this applies to 
things, lovers and ideas. Agency, of course, requires a body acting in time and space and is 
meaningless without it. (ibid., p. 145) 
 
In The Mystery of Consciousness, Searle (1998, p. 184) treats the experience of our body as 
"the central reference point of all forms of consciousness". He emphasizes the brain's 
capacity to form a "body image" and tells us that the match between where bodily sensations 
seem to be and the actual physical body is "entirely created in the brain" (ibid., p. 182). To 
demonstrate this, Searle uses the example of phantom limbs, a condition in which a patient 
may still feel pain in a limb which has been amputated. Partly based on Israel Rosenfield's 
theories, Searle explains that our sense of self is a sense of experiences affecting the body 
image. "My conscious experience of my own body as an object in space and time, an 
experience that is in fact constructed in my brain", he writes, "is the basic element that runs 
through all of our conscious experiences" (ibid., p. 185). 
 
3.4 Summary 3.1-3.3 
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Although Damasio, Hood and the other aforementioned scholars explain much more in depth 
the science behind the self process, for the purpose of our discussion it will suffice to keep in 
mind the following:  
 
(a) although the self is an illusion in the sense that it is highly malleable and it is the result of 
a number of different processes, we still experience our selves as a "bounded, single 
individual that changes ever so gently across time but, somehow, seems to stay the same" 
(also referred to as "stability" in Damasio, 1999, p. 134);  
 
(b) stability and singularity depend on the organism having a boundary, meaning structures 
that separate what is inside the organism from what is outside. Damasio writes that "If there 
is no boundary, there is no body, and if there is no body, there is no organism" (ibid., p. 137). 
The "internal milieu" of the organism, as he calls it, is a precursor to the self;  
 
(c) the important features of the simple self that form the basis for the autobiographical self, 
namely the sense of perspective, ownership and agency, which tell me that I am interacting 
with an object; and 
 
(d) the sense of self described in (a) can be thought of as a center of narrative gravity, and the 
story of our self would then be a constructed narrative that our brain creates (as shown in 
section 3.1). 
 
3.5 Where science and literary criticism converge: The 
self and autobiography  
Writing about autobiography in the first half of the 20th century, philologist Georg Misch 
defined the genre as "the description (graphia) of an individual human life (bios) by the 
individual himself (autos)" (in Smith and Watson, 2010, p. 195).  
 With the so-called "second wave" of autobiography criticism that came along in the 
second half of that century, attention was turned from the bios to the subject, the autos of 
autobiography. Influenced, among other things, by Marxism, Freudian psychoanalysis and 
Saussurean linguistics, critics started looking at the self as estranged and fragmented. Smith 
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and Watson have written that "[a]s a result, the project of self-representation could no longer 
be read as providing direct access to the truth of the self" (2010, p. 201).  
 One can already see signs of this shift in French scholar Georges Gusdorf's famous 
essay from 1956, where he describes the exploration of the self as some sort of dangerous and 
dark pursuit. He writes, for instance, that "[s]ociology, depth psychology, psychoanalysis 
have revealed the complex and agonizing sense that the encounter of a man with his image 
carries" (Gusdorf, 1956, p. 80; my italics). Gusdorf still refers, however, to "the true person", 
the subject of autobiography which only the individual himself has access to (ibid., p. 83). In 
1960, Roy Pascal was aware that "one's self-knowledge may be illusory; the more one 
probes, the further the truth seems to recede" (Pascal, 1960, p. 70).  
 It was during the 1970s and 1980s, however, that the notion of the unified self, this 
"true person", was seriously put under fire. As James Olney explains (1980, p. 22), French 
critics such as Barthes, Foucault and Derrida paved the way for the idea that "the self that 
was not really in existence in the beginning, is in the end merely a matter of text and has 
nothing whatever to do with an authorizing author".  
 Smith and Watson (2010, p. 206) bring attention to Derrida's notion of the self as "a 
fiction, an illusion constituted in discourse, a hypothetical place or space of storytelling". 
Roland Barthes, who famously announced "the death of the author" in the end of the 1960's, 
also thought that the self lacked a central core (in Eakin, 1992, p. 6), and Paul de Man (1979, 
p. 921) proposed that autobiography was not even a genre, but a "figure of reading" and that 
its difference from fiction was "undecidable". Referentiality in autobiography was, according 
to de Man, "an illusion produced by the rhetorical structure of language" (Eakin, 1985, p. 
186), in such a way that the writer is "written by the discourse he employs" (ibid., p. 189). 
 Through the lens of modern autobiography criticism, the unified self thus became a 
mere construct, a fiction, an effect of discourse. In 1982, Janet Varner Gunn lamented the fact 
that even though autobiography had gained some degree of acceptance as a genre, "it is now 
declared a hoax, or defined as a mausoleum preserving a 'self' which otherwise would not 
exist at all" (Gunn, 1982, p. 30).  
 Post-structuralist theories had a significant impact on later studies of autobiography. 
Eakin writes in the beginning of the 1990's that following the shift of perspective from fact to 
fiction in autobiography studies, as well as the post-structuralist attack on the concept of the 
unified self, "reference in autobiography remains ... a rather forbidding subject" (Eakin, 1992, 
p. 29).  
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 In the past two decades, three terms have become central in autobiography criticism: 
performativity, positionality and relationality. In theories of performativity, identity is not 
seen as an essential and fixed attribute of the subject, but as something "enacted and 
reiterated through cultural norms and discourses"; "an effect of storytelling" (Smith and 
Watson, 2010, p. 214). Positionality turns attention to the cultural and historical placement of 
the subject, and "subject positions" are viewed as "effects of social relations whose power is 
distributed unevenly and asymmetrically across difference" (ibid., p. 215). Finally, 
relationality refers to the idea that "the narrator's story is often refracted through the stories of 
others" (ibid., p. 216) and emphasizes the subject's lack of autonomy. According to Smith and 
Watson, all of these terms point to a disbelief in the universal, stable and autonomous 
individual, and shift the focus to the idea of the subject in process and in context.   
 At the brink of the new millenium, the possibility of referentiality was still being 
questioned by autobiography critics. Mary Evans, for instance, wrote in 1999 about the 
"impossibility of auto/biography" and argued that the genre was in "urgent need of 
reclassification; that its place on the library shelves is not with non-fiction but very much 
closer to fiction" (Evans, 1999, p. 202).  
 A decade later, Smith and Watson don't go so far as placing what they call "self life 
writing" (they do not view autobiography as a single genre) in the category of fiction. They 
imply, however, that the idea of the unified and stable core self remains powerless, at least in 
theory:  
 
Readers often conceive of autobiographical narrators as telling unified stories of their lives, as creating 
or discovering coherent selves. But both the unified story and the coherent self are myths of identity. 
For there is no coherent "self" that precedes stories about identity, about "who" one is. Nor is there a 
unified, stable, immutable self that can remember everything that happened in the past. (Smith and 
Watson, 2010, p. 61) 
 
Even Eakin, who as far as I can tell is one of the few literary theorists really interested in 
neuroscience, comes to the conclusion that the self "of course, which we take to be 
experiental fact, is also finally a fiction, an elusive creature that we construct even as we seek 
to encounter it" (Eakin, 2008, p. 125).  
 Based on the studies mentioned in chapter 3.1, I certainly understand why Smith and 
Watson write that the unified story and the coherent self are myths. It is also common-sense 
that no one is able to remember everything that happened in the past (although there are rare 
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cases such as Jill Price's, who became known in the media as "the woman who can't forget").9 
The part I disagree with is the assumption that "there is no coherent 'self' that precedes stories 
about identity" and that there is no "unified, stable ... self" in the act of recalling the past (ref. 
what I have written in sections 3.2 and 3.3 about the core self and about the self being a 
necessary illusion).  
 Is it really that naïve and inconceivable that an autobiographical text could have 
anything to do with a life story or a coherent self? In the next chapter I will be reviewing 
recent research on autobiographical memories and how these are thought to be organized in 
our brains in order to form a unified story of a life based on a singular, stable self (as illusory 





4 Autobiographical memory and the life 
story 
It is impossible to talk about the self (at least the extended self) without talking about 
memory. As Damasio (1999, p. 196) explains, the sense of self arises precisely "in the 
consistent, reiterated display of some of our own personal memories, the objects of our 
personal past". Autobiographical selves are "autobiographies made conscious" (Damasio, 
2010, p. 210), and autobiographies are made of personal memories. We need conventional 
memory to construct an autobiographical self and working memory (the ability to hold 
images in mind for some time) to make it explicit (Damasio, 1999, p. 217).  
 Damasio suggests that each autobiographical memory generates a pulse of core 
consciousness, just as it happens with objects that are perceived in the external world, thus 
generating "a sense of self knowing": 
Whenever an object X provokes a pulse of core consciousness and the core self emerges relative to 
object X, selected sets of facts from the implicit autobiographical self are also consistently activated as 
explicit memories and provoke pulses of core consciousness of their own. (ibid., p. 218) 
 
When we remember an object, we retrieve sensory data about the object as well as the past 
reactions of the organism to that object. "This is why we can be conscious of what we 
remember as much as we are conscious of what we actually see, hear, or touch now", 
Damasio explains (ibid., p. 161). This organization allows us to develop an autobiographical 
self. Thus, once again, Damasio stresses the importance of core consciousness as a 
foundation for all other higher-order processes: without it, we would have no knowledge of 
the moment, the past or the anticipated future (ibid., pp. 218-219). 
 Autobiographical memories are an important criterion of personal identity. "My sense 
that I am exactly the same person over time, from my first-person point of view, is in large 
part a matter of my ability to produce conscious memories of earlier conscious events in my 
life", Searle (2004, p. 198) writes. The continuity of our memory experiences (which, as we 
will see in section 4.3, are organized by the brain in the form of a narrative), allows us to 
experience ourselves as continuing selves. 
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 How are autobiographical memories encoded, organized and recalled? We will now 
take a look at a model which has been frequently cited by scholars since it was first 
introduced by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000): the Self Memory System.  
4.1 The Self Memory System 
The amount of research that has been done on the workings of memory is extensive, to put it 
mildly. According to Ball (2010, p. 11), the first experimental analysis of human memory 
was made already in the 1800s by Hermann Ebbinghaus, who devised three-letter nonsense 
syllables which he then used as mental stimuli. It wasn't until the 1970's, however, that the 
focus on memory research shifted to what Ball calls "real-world memory topics" and a 
systematic examination of autobiographical memory began.  
 Over the past fifteen years, interest on this specific area of memory studies has only 
increased, with many cognitive psychologists devoting themselves to the study of how people 
"encode, store and retrieve information pertaining to real-life events and personal 
experiences" (McAdams, 2001, p. 107). 
 Autobiographical memory is composed of records of who we have been, both 
physically and behaviourally, and who we plan to be in the future, which combine to form the 
story of our lives. More specifically, these records include: (a) abstract knowledge about the 
self; (b) general or summary forms of personal knowledge, and (c) memory of specific events 
(Mace, 2010, p. 4).  
 Memory scholars Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) have proposed that 
autobiographical memories form what they call the Self Memory System (SMS), in which 
these three kinds of memory records are organized hierarchically and divided into the 
following three categories: lifetime periods, general events and event-specific knowledge. 
Items of event-specific knowledge are part of general events and general events are in turn 
part of lifetimes periods.  
 As Conway and Pleydell-Pearce explain, lifetime periods include knowledge of 
elements, such as people, places and actions, characteristic of a period. They have identifiable 
beginnings and endings, and include both thematic and temporal knowledge about the period. 
Examples of lifetime periods (which may overlap) are "When I lived with X" or "When I 
worked in Y" (Conway, 1990, p. 115). Furthermore, lifetime periods are usually measured in 
units of years (Conway, 1996, p. 67).  
 As to general events, they are "events that happened over periods of days or weeks 
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but which did not themselves directly refer to a single specific datable memory" (Conway, 
1990, p. 116), and encompass both repeated events and single events (Conway's examples are 
"evening hikes to meadows" or "my trip to Paris"). General events represent more specific 
types of event knowledge typically measured in units of months, weeks and days (Conway, 
1996, p. 67).  
 Event-specific knowledge (ESK) includes memories of single events lasting perhaps 
seconds, minutes or hours (ibid.).  
 As we will see in the analysis of Graciliano Ramos' autobiography Infância in chapter 
5, all three kinds of autobiographical knowledge (lifetime periods, general events and ESK) 
are present when people tell the stories of their lives. According to Schacter (1996, pp. 90-
91), they serve different functions. He describes general events as natural entry-points into 
autobiographical memories, meaning they are the ones we often describe when people ask us 
about our past. This is probably because they refer to experiences that have been repeated and 
are not very specific, although, as Schacter writes, they do capture "a good deal of the 
distinctive flavor of our past". Being even more general than general events, memories of 
lifetime periods are usually where we start looking when we want to retrieve a memory for a 
general event or a specific event; they provide "the skeletal structure of our autobiographical 
memories" (ibid.).  
 Remembering the past, then, is not the same as retrieving a single representation 
stored in memory, but rather combining information from each of the three levels of 
autobiographical knowledge (see also Singer and Blagov, 2004, p. 127). 
 
The SMS is furthermore a model of the relationship between autobiographical memory and 
the self. It describes the interaction betwen the so-called episodic memory system, working 
self and long-term self. An image might make it easier to visualize the SMS before I explain 




Let's start with the episodic memory system. Conway et al. (2004, p. 496) explain that this 
base contains details (sensory, perceptive, affective and so on) of "short time-slices of 
experience", which can give us a feeling of reliving a past event.  
 The working self mediates the formation of episodic memories in the course of a day 
(in Figure 2, the working self would be interacting both with the episodic memory system 
and the long term self). Some of these episodic memories are recalled for a short period of 
time and then lost, for example after a sleep cycle. A few of them, however, are retained for a 
longer period of time and become integrated with autobiographical knowledge. The working 
self organizes current experience (the "psychological present") in terms of goal processing. 
By doing so, it has a hand in determining which features will be retained in episodic memory 
records, which Conway et al. (ibid., p. 502) believe are consolidated as summaries of the 
psychological present. 
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 As to the long-term self, it consists of an autobiographical knowledge base and a 
conceptual self. Through the combination of elements from both the long-term self and the 
aforementioned episodic memory system, full-blown autobiographical memories are 
generated.  
 Lifetime periods and general event knowledge structures are found in the  
autobiographical knowledge base. As we can see from Figure 2, Conway et. al (ibid., p. 499) 
add another level of autobiographical knowledge containing even more general information 
than lifetime periods: the Life Story Schema. It consists of knowledge of how a life story is 
contructed within the person's culture (with temporal order, dominant themes, et cetera). The 
life story schema contributes to the development of an elaborated life story, which we will 
come back to in section 4.3. 
 The second element in the long-term self that contributes to the formation of 
autobiographical memories is the conceptual self. It does so by interacting with the 
autobiographical knowledge base and contributing to its organization in terms of lifetime 
periods and general events. The conceptual self consists of abstract knowledge structures 
which are not temporally specific, such as possible selves, attitudes, values and beliefs, 
among other things. "The units of the conceptual self are socially constructed schemas and 
categories that help to define the self, other people, and typical interactions with others and 
the surrounding world" (ibid., p. 500). These schemata are drawn largely from family, school, 
religion, myths and other cultural influences.  
 Conway et al. give a helpful example of how the conceptual self works with the 
autobiographical knowledge base: "an individual who held a view of himself as ‘practical’ 
instead of ‘intellectual’ might have a lifetime period representation of his time at university 
as being largely negative. General event and specific episodic memories might be 
preferentially available to confirm this belief" (ibid.).  
 
In short, then, the working self contributes to the formation of episodic memories, which are 
summary records of the psychological present. These episodic memories are stored in the 
episodic memory system. Most of them are quickly lost, but some combine with lifetime 
period and general event structures from the autobiographical knowledge base. Along with 
the conceptual self, the autobiographical knowledge base forms what is known as the long-
term self. Through the interaction of the long-term self and the episodic memory system, 
autobiographical memories are formed.   
 
29 
Guiding the construction of autobiographical memories are personal goals, and it is within 
the working self that goals are generated and organized. As McAdams explains (2001, p. 
108), memories are "encoded and later retrieved in ways that serve the self's goal agendas. As 
such, current goals influence how autobiographical information is absorbed and organized in 
the first place, and goals generate retrieval models to guide the search process later". Conway 
et al. (2004, p. 494) suggest that a critical function of memory is to keep track of progress in 
goal-attainment, and goals in turn have a vital role in the consolidation of memories. They 
believe that "goal-transitions are critical events in memory formation and that they 
psychologically or cognitively mark event boundaries", i.e. they mark the end of an event and 
the start of another. It is even possible, Conway et al. (ibid., p. 495) say, that the integration 
of episodic memories with autobiographical memory knowledge structures is not fully 
achieved "until the goals to which they relate have themselves been achieved or abandoned".  
 Here is how Singer and Blagov (2004, p. 128) explain how the SMS works in the 
process of recall:  
Once a working self activates a goal-related search in the autobiographical knowledge base, the self-
memory system guides the selection and elaboration of goal-relevant cues that access specific 
autobiographical memories, the evaluation of selected memories for goal compatibility, and the 
bringing forth of autobiographical knowledge into consciousness. The activation of particular 
memories is always weighed against the general needs of the overall self for affect regulation and 
maintenance of an acceptable self-concept. 
 
As this description suggests, balance between goals and whichever memories are encoded or 
recalled is an important element of the SMS. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000, p. 268) 
explain that the SMS may, for instance, prevent the recall of destabilizing knowledge which 
could "increase self-discrepancies and reactivate dysfunctional attachment behaviors and 
feelings". This is relevant because we can now discuss what Conway et al. (2004, p. 492) call 
adaptive correspondence and self-coherence—two competing demands from which 
autobiographical memory is said to emerge.  
 Adaptive correspondence refers to our need to "encode an experience-near record of 
ongoing goal activity", allowing the working self to keep track of where it is in the process of 
executing goals. Self-coherence refers to a simultaneous need to maintain "a coherent and 
stable record of the self's interaction with the world that extends beyond the present 
moment", and serves to keep the working self connected to remember reality, supporting "the 
generation of different images or versions of the self-in-the-past and the self-in-the-future" 
(ibid., p. 496). When coherence can no longer be achieved, which is the case in some types of 
brain damage or psychopathological illness, ungrounded delusional versions of the self 
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emerge, versions which do not correspond with reality (ibid.).  
 According to Conway, memories represent information about progress in goal 
attainment and therefore "have to reflect reality to at least some extent" (ibid.). On the other 
hand, the working self makes sure that knowledge and memories that confirm and support 
current self-conceptions are highly available and "may also operate to distort and/or inhibit 
memories that undermine the current self".  
 To call self-coherence a mere "myth of identity", as literary critics have (see Smith 
and Watson, 2010, p. 61), doesn't seem to be entirely accurate. Theories outlined in this 
chapter and in chapter 3 show us that it actually seems to be more of a biological and 
existential imperative.  
 
How do autobiographical memory and the self relate in terms of the SMS model? The 
answer, according to Conway et al. (2004, p. 522), is that autobiographical memory renders 
"accurate records of the working self's engagement in goal activity, while at the same time 
insuring that such activities reinforce the coherence of the long-term self."  
 With that in mind, we are now starting to move from the subject of consolidation and 
retrieval of autobiographical material in memory to how our brains build life narratives in 
order to make sense of experience and maintain a sense of identity. Many of our personal 
memories are vivid and affectively intense, but only some memories have special relevance 
to our enduring concerns or unresolved conflicts and, consequently, are more significant to 
self-definition: they are aptly called self-defining memories. 
4.2 Self-defining memories 
Self-defining memories (SDMs) are a specific kind of autobiographical memory 
characterized by (see Singer and Blagov, 2004, pp. 119-120): 
 
(a) affective intensity: they have the power to affect us emotionally, also during recollection; 
 
(b) vividness: they have a strong sensory quality, usually visual; 
 
(c) high levels of rehearsal: they are repetitively recalled, and we return to them because they 
are of significance and serve as reference points in our lives; 
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(d) linkage to similar memories: they tell us something about how we perceive ourselves and 
are therefore likely to be connected to other related memories with similar goals, concerns, 
outcomes and affective responses, a process which in turn reinforces self-perception; and 
 
(e) connection to an enduring concern or unresolved conflict: they reflect long-term and 
central areas of concern or conflict within the personality, because they touch on timeless 
themes that shape the person's sense of identity. Examples of that could be conflicts with 
parents, personal triumphs or moments of personal insight.  
 
It is (d) and (e) that are said to be the two criteria that differentiate SDMs from other 
important personal event memories (Conway et al., 2004, p. 504).  
 Conway et al. (ibid., p. 505) refer to a couple of interesting studies on SDMs which 
show that this type of memory is linked to enduring themes in an individual's life. Thorne, 
Cutting and Skaw (1998, in ibid.), for example, interviewed young adults twice on important 
relationship memories over a six-month period of time. They found that both memories that 
were recalled only once and those that were repeated in T1 and T2, tended to have similar 
themes. This indicates that even when SDMs vary in content, they still tend to reflect "similar 
motivational themes and narrative structure" (ibid.).   
 In another study by Demorest and Alexander (1992, in ibid.), individuals that had 
been interviewed about their significant personal memories were asked, one month later, to 
create fictional scenarios. The experiment showed, again, a thematic similarity between 
remembered and imagined experiences.  
 Thinking in terms of the SMS model, SDMs are "particularly powerful integrations" 
(ibid., p. 507) of (a) the knowledge structures within the conceptual self and (b) elements 
within the autobiographical knowledge base that are linked thematically to these scripts. 
Based on Tomkins' script theory, Conway et al. explain that scripts, the abstract structures 
within the conceptual self, are built from units of personality called "scenes", consisting of an 
affect (sadness or happiness, for example), the object of that affect and sometimes also 
outcomes. 
 When a certain number of scenes are linked together, as described in (d) at the 
beginning of this section, the result in an abstracted script. This linking of similar memories 
is referred to as "psychological magnification", and it may affect how new memories are 
generated, in the sense that these will be prone to fit the existing narrative sequence in other 
SDMs, sometimes in a distorted manner (ibid., pp. 510-511). Conway et al. (ibid.) refer to 
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this as a "breakdown in the balance between adaptive correspondence ... and self-coherence", 
which is another way of saying that our need for self-consistency sometimes results in 
distorted memories. Bruce Hood also describes the importance of coherence in his account of 
the self illusion: "when inconsistencies arise", he writes, "the system, strongly influenced by 
language, works to reestablish coherence" (Hood, 2012, p. 233). This is one of the things that 
have led literary scholars over the years to discuss the problem of truth in autobiography (I've 
already touched this subject in chapter 2 and I will go back to it in section 4.4, which deals 
with memory's fallibility).   
 
Since the 1980s, many psychologists have shown interest in the idea of narrative processing, 
in which thought is organized through the devices of story. This mode of organizing 
information is believed to have had great evolutionary value because it allows us to test 
scenarios before acting.10  
 In his theory of consciousness, Damasio also describes narrative processing. 
According to him, the brain produces an extremely large amount of images relating to 
everything one perceives or recalls, as well as to the state of one's own body when faced with 
such images. He explains that the brain organizes all this material by giving it some sort of 
narrative structure, which means selecting certain images and ordering them in time and 
space (Damasio, 2010, p. 173).  
 Singer and Blagov (2004, p. 121) propose that SDMs are "a subset of 'narrative 
processing', or storied thought" and represent "momentary expressions of identity". They 
equate identity with an autobiographical narrative which each of us constructs "to weave 
together [our] past, present, and anticipated future into a unified whole". It is identity which 
creates a sense of coherence and meaning within a life: "If narrative identity is the 
autobiographical text of an entire life, self-defining memories are uniquely eloquent passages 
that dramatize the major themes of the overarching narrative" (ibid., p. 123).  
  In the SMS, memories are, as we've seen, linked to a hierarchy of goals. SDMs are 
memories that "have the most relevance to the life story of identity fashioned by the 
                                                        10 Steven Pinker writes that "the cliché that life imitates art is true because the function of some kinds of art is for life to imitate it" (1997, p. 543). Fictional narratives, he says, give us a glimpse of situations we might face someday and present us with strategies for deploying them, as well as outcomes. Also Tooby & Cosmides (2001, p. 23) tell us that fiction unleashes  "our  reactions  to potential  lives  and  realities, we  feel more  richly  and adaptively  about what we have  not  actually  experienced".  They  also  think  that  stories  are  told  in  a  way  that  "mimics  the  format  in  which experienced events are mentally represented and stored in memory" (ibid., p. 24). I suppose non‐fictional stories can serve the same purpose. 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individual" (ibid., p. 129; my italics), and as such they are believed to play a particularly 
significant role in the SMS.  
 What I am trying to do is to establish a relationship between the sense of ownership 
the self has toward its own autobiographical memories (and hence to its life narrative) and the 
acceptance in the readers' minds of autobiography as a distinct genre of writing. For that I 
must proceed to explain what Singer and Blagov mean by "life story".  
4.3 Self-narrative and the life story theory 
One of the functions of autobiographical memory is to provide a life story that guides our 
self-goals, Ball (2010, p. 12) writes. A theory that is often cited in the field of psychology, is 
D. P. McAdams' life story model of identity, which states that we all construct internalized 
and evolving narratives of the self. Drawing on McAdams, Blagov and Singer (2004, p. 131) 
explain that the life story "expresses the individual's effort to step back from both goal 
pursuits and accumulated autobiographical knowledge and weave these two aspects of self-
understanding into an overall coherent picture of the self".  
 Using terms borrowed from dramaturgical and literary discourses, McAdams argues 
that identity takes the form of a story, with setting, scenes, characters, plot, and themes 
(McAdams, 2001, p 101). These elements are thus not exclusive to literature, but are also 
believed to be present in the kind of processing which we employ when we think about past 
experiences. The important thing about the overarching life story narrative is that it tells us 
something about archetypal individuals in our lives, turning points, particular episodes that 
matter to our personal stories and so on.   
 McAdams stresses that although life stories are based on autobiographical facts, we 
"selectively appropriate aspects of ... experience and imaginatively construe both past and 
future to construct stories that make sense". Life stories reflect, in addition, cultural values 
and norms (ibid.). To draw a parallel to the SMS, we can say that the life story contains self-
defining information related to lifetime periods, general events and event-specific knowledge. 
 For McAdams (2003, p. 195), general events and event specific knowledge constitute 
what he calls nuclear episodes in the life story, for instance high points, low points and 
turning points in our lives. It is here that the concept of self-defining memories fits within the 
life story theory, as these kinds of memories are believed to "occupy the most prominent 
positions within an identity as a life story". 
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 In McAdams' life story model, it is not until late adolescence that people start giving 
their past, present and anticipated future the shape of an internalized and evolving self-story. 
During this phase, he explains, "people ... seek to integrate their disparate roles, talents, 
proclivities, and social involvements into a patterned configuration of thought and activity 
that provides life with some semblance of psychosocial unity and purpose" (McAdams, 2001, 
p. 102). One of the key functions of identity, then, is to integrate contrasting elements of our 
lives and bring them together into a meaningful and temporally organized whole. 
 Drawing from Habermas and Bluck (in ibid.), McAdams says that in order to form an 
integrative life story, we need to have developed understanding of four types of coherence: 
temporal, biographical, causal and thematic; and these are not all fully developed and ready 
to be used together for identity formation until adolescence. Still, this is a process that starts 
in childhood.  
 Autobiographical memory is believed to emerge at about two years of age, "when 
children have consolidated a basic sense of I and reflexively have begun to build up a 
rudimentary understanding of the me" (McAdams, 2003, p. 191). I interpret the "I" here as 
something similar to the feeling of ownership and agency that Damasio speaks of (the self-as-
knower), and the "me" as the self-as-object. The building of autobiographical memory 
implies that we have a sense of events that we experience as "things that happened to me" 
and are related to "my life" (ibid.).  
 Later, children also start to narrate single autobiographical events with temporal 
coherence and the structure of a life story based on cultural norms: "Cultural norms define 
conventional phases of the life course and suggest what kinds of narrative forms make sense 
in the telling of a life" (ibid., p. 192). Thus the life story at this stage also acquires 
biographical coherence.  
 During adolescence, causal coherence is also added to the life story, as we start to 
make efforts to explain through narrative how events are linked together and, as McAdams 
points out, "[t]raits, attitudes, beliefs, and preferences may now be explained in terms of the 
life events that may have caused them" (ibid.). Also during adolescence, stories develop 
thematic coherence, meaning that we are able to identify overarching themes that bring 
episodes from the life story together. In the course of adulthood, life stories develop and 
change, and we focus on different aspects of our life story at different stages in life.  
 There is one important distinction that Robinson and Taylor (1998, in McAdams 
2001, p. 110) have made between autobiographical memories and self-narratives. 
Autobiographical memory may include episodes that have little relevance for self-concept, 
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while self-narratives consist of "salient experiences and concerns that constitute one's 
identity" (ibid.). In other words, a self-narrative is based on some parts of autobiographical 
memory (which in turn contains knowledge that is not a part of the self-narrative), as well as 
elements that do not belong to autobiographical memory, such as the anticipated future.  
 As I will explain more in depth in the next section, McAdams (ibid., p. 110) has (as 
he calls it) a "moderately reconstructive" view of autobiographical recollections, meaning 
that he acknowledges that distortion of memories occurs, but at the same time thinks that life 
stories rely more on selection and interpretation—which brings us to the question of memory 
reliability, and the ways our recollections of the past may mislead us.  
 
4.4 Memory's fallibility 
As mentioned, memory is essential to the development of an autobiographical self, and it is 
hence also essential to literary autobiography. The problem with memory which is most often 
brought up by those who study the genre, is memory's fallibility. Hood (2012, p. 76) tells us 
that "[w]ithout the ability to form memories, your sense of self would be shattered". Yet it 
has long been known that memories, as he also points out, are not exact copies of past events, 
but reconstructions, which means that they change (slightly or considerably) every time they 
are reactivated.  
 It is also a fact that completely false memories can be constructed (see examples in 
ibid., pp. 80-81; Neisser, 1994, p. 5). Even self-defining memories, which are intense, vivid 
and repetitively recalled, are not mere descriptions, but affectively charged reconstructions of 
past experiences (Singer and Blagov, 2004, p. 126). 
 So far in this paper I have presented different theories which point to more or less the 
same conclusion: that we need an "I", a core self, in order to form a continuous self narrative, 
or life story, and we need this life story in order to maintain a sense of identity, the "me", or 
self-as-object. In The man who mistook his wife for a hat, Sacks (1987, pp. 108-119) 
describes the case of Mr. Thompson, a patient with severe Korsakov's who could remember 
nothing for more than a few seconds. "Abysses of amnesia continually opened beneath him, 
but he would bridge them, nimbly, by fluent confabulations and fictions of all kinds", he 
explains (ibid., p. 109). What this case points to is our need to produce a continuous and 
coherent self-narrative, which sometimes forces us to remodel reality or even unknowingly 
concoct "non-truths" (a term Sacks prefers).  
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 Mr. Thompson is an extreme case, obviously, but this sort of self-invention has led 
scholars such as Jerome Bruner (1994, p. 41) to argue that Self is not "an entity that one can 
simply remember", but it is instead a result of several mental processes. Like McAdams, 
Bruner argues that self-construction involves telling stories using the usual elements of 
narrative, from which he concludes that there is no "essential self" to be known. "Rather, we 
constantly construct and reconstruct our selves to meet the needs of the situations we 
encounter" (Bruner, 2002, p. 4).  
 Using a neurological disorder called dysnarrativia (an impairment in the ability to tell 
and understand stories) as evidence, he firmly states that if we lacked the capacity to make 
stories about ourselves, there would be no such thing as selfhood (ibid., p. 13). Because we 
constantly reconstruct our selves through story-telling, memories can be reshaped to fit better 
within our self-story at a given time. "Self-making is a narrative art," Bruner (ibid., p. 4) says, 
"and though it is more constrained by memory than fiction is, it is uneasily constrained".  
 Based on what we've learned from Damasio, however, I assume Bruner is referring to 
the self in extended consciousness. It seems to me like there is an essential self to be known: 
the self that starts in core consciousness (ref. section 3.2) with the body as reference point. 
Through the build-up of memories which are attributed to this self, a life story and a sense of 
identity unfold. My point is that the autobiographical self might be subject to change and 
filled with uncertainty, but it is hardly baseless.  
 The problem of truth is considered a major methodological difficulty for scientists 
dedicated to autobiographical memory research. As Ball writes (2010, p. 12), "[h]ow do we 
know if the participant is recalling a true autobiographical memory if the experimenter was 
not there at the time and if the participant may not even be able to distinguish their true 
retrievals from false retrievals?"   
 McAdams notes that there are both veridical copy theories, which argue that some 
personal events are remembered accurately, as well as reconstructive theories, which focus 
on the instances in which personal events are misremembered. He cites Barclay (in 
McAdams, 2001, p. 107), who suggests that autobiographical memory is "a form of 
improvisation, whereby the person puts together a more or less plausible account of the past 
that functions primarily to maintain personal coherence", as opposed to being concerned with 
objective descriptions of events in the past.  
 As McAdams also notes, there is no either/or division between these two views. Some 
memory researchers argue, for instance, that recent memories can be very referential in the 
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sense that they contain a good deal of specific information from the original experience, but 
that events that are distant in time tend to be more reconstructive (see ibid., p. 108).  
 As I wrote in the previous section, McAdams' life story model adopts a "moderately 
reconstructive view of autobiographical recollections" (2003, p. 195), arguing that goals and 
other personal concerns shape the encoding and recollection of self-defining memories within 
the life story. To explain why, he refers to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's SMS model, which 
suggests that goals modulate the construction as well as the retrieval of autobiographical 
memories.  
 Westbury and Dennett (2000, p. 19) also write that what we recall is a reconstruction 
of what we experienced that is "consistent with our goals and our knowledge of the world". 
In this view, remembering is a kind of "imaginative reconstruction" (ibid.). For Ross and 
Wilson (2000, p. 232), autobiographical memory is also "a constructive process" of creative 
nature; something we can see, for instance, when people remember the same episode 
differently. 
 McAdams believes that the reconstruction that occurs when we recall an episode from 
our past can have a distorting effect, especially for memories that are very distant timewise. 
Still, when it comes to life stories, he thinks that recollection involves more selection and 
interpretation than outright distortion of the truth. By that he means that to a certain degree 
we choose which memories will become self-defining and which will not. Identity is 
consequently "a product of choice" (McAdams, 2003, p. 196), and not always of free choice, 
since we are influenced by social, historical and political contexts. As Neisser (1994, p. 2) 
also  points out, self-narratives do not rely only on memories. Sometimes people include in 
their life stories episodes which they don't actually remember, "if the narrator is significantly 
sure of them".  
 Although it is widely accepted that we can produce false memories, what kind of 
autobiographical knowledge are we most prone to remember correctly? According to Thorne 
(1995, p. 141), research has shown that retrospective accounts of personally important and 
specific events are more likely to be veridical than accounts of more general events and of 
emotionally neutral events, and so are retrospective accounts of negative events.  
 Reconstruction and slight distortions of memories, do not automatically make them 
fictional. There is also the question which McAdams brings up concerning the degree to 
which a memory is distorted. The fact that we misremember peripheral details of a memory, 
for example, does not necessarily mean that the recall of central details will be impaired.  
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 Conway (1990, p. 9) writes that "in autobiographical memory, ... it is not usually the 
case that a memory is completely false but rather that a memory relates to an event which did 
occur but not exactly as remembered". Conway's take on the truth vs. (unintentional) falsity 
conundrum is that it makes "little sense" to ask if a memory is true or not. Autobiographical 
memories are never, as I mentioned earlier, literal representations of the past. But, as Conway 
reminds us (ibid.), they can still be accurate without being literal. Errors sometimes even 
emphasize the meaning of a recalled memory, precisely because memory is usually 
compatible with the beliefs and understandings of the rememberer (ibid., p. 11).  
 In his description of how memory works, Damasio agrees that "perfectly faithful 
memory is a myth, applicable only to trivial objects" (2010, p. 133), but he also points out 
that as lived experiences are reconstructed and replayed, their substance is "reassessed and 
inevitably rearranged, modified minimally or very much in terms of their factual composition 
and emotional accompaniment" (ibid., p. 211), which is by no means the same as saying that 
there isn't any trace of reference to reality in them. Psychologist Eugene Winograd (1994, p. 
243) aptly notes that "no matter how passive or dynamic one's theory of memory function, it 
would be very surprising from an evolutionary standpoint if our memories had little to do 
with the events of our past at all". 
 Ross and Wilson (2000, p. 237) cite many examples of bias in recall, but at the same 
time they remind us that "research on autobiographical recall does not indicate that biased 
recollections are more common than accurate recollections", and that many studies have 
actually shown that "people's recollections can be fairly accurate, at least for the gist of past 
experiences".  
 Renowned psychologist Daniel L. Schacter has written about the many ways in which 
we can produce false memories. He explains, for instance, how old memories can sometimes 
corrupt new ones (Schacter, 1996, p. 104), how things we only expect to happen can become 
incorporated into a new memory (ibid., p. 102), and how present needs and beliefs can have a 
distorting effect on memories (also known as "recall biases", ibid., pp. 105-106). Schacter 
also makes reference to Elizabeth Loftus' much cited study that showed how false 
recollections of complex experiences can be fabricated (in ibid., p. 109). Repeating a false 
statement or rehearsing innacurate information can also lead us to believe that it is true (ibid., 
pp. 111-112).  
 In the end, however, Schacter takes a relatively moderate stand on the issue of truth 
vs. fiction in memory studies. He writes that we need to recognize that "memories do not 
exist in one of two states—either true or false—and that the important task is to examine how 
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and in what ways memory corresponds to reality" (ibid., p. 277). He also points out that 
although autobiographical memories are complex constructions, there are "good reasons to 
believe that our memories for the broad contours of our lives are fundamentally accurate" 
(ibid., p. 94).  
 
 
To summarize what has been discussed so far in this chapter, autobiographical memory helps 
"ground the self within an ongoing life story featuring extended lifetime periods ..., 
knowledge about typical or characteristic life events and specific and sometimes vivid details 
of particularly well-remembered scenes" (McAdams, 2001, p. 117), some of which, as we've 
seen, are self-defining. Although many believe that autobiographical memories in general are 
fairly accurate, some degree of distortion may occur, especially at the level of event specific 
knowlegde, and in some extreme cases, entire memories can be fabricated.  
 
 
How do the ideas we've reviewed concerning the formation of autobiographical memories 
and their insertion within a self-narrative, known as a life story, relate to autobiography 
theories in the field of literature? I touched the subject in section 4.2 when I mentioned that 
coherence and unity perhaps should not be dismissed so quickly as "myths", relegating life 
writing to the realm of fiction. I will now explain this in more detail.  
4.5 Where science and literary criticism converge: 
Memory and autobiography 
"It is certainly troubling to confront the possibility that our life stories could be subject to 
profound distortion, because in the final analysis the memories that give rise to these stories 
are all that stay with us from cradle to grave", Schacter writes (1996, p. 95). In addition to the 
fragmentary and malleable nature of the self discussed in section 3.5, memory's fallibility has 
also been a troubling issue in the study of literary autobiography.  
 Writing about the need to rethink the notion of fiction, Freeman (2003, pp. 116-117) 
lists some of the reasons why autobiography may by some be relegated to the status of mere 
fiction. Some of them I have already made reference to in this chapter: "In addition to the 
problem of false coherence, ... there are problems such as wishful thinking, defenses, 
illusions, delusions, and so on. (...) There is also the problem of placing meanings onto the 
past that, in some sense, don't belong", as well as "an impulse to dramatize untruthfully the 
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unsufficiently dramatic, to complicate the essentially simple, to charge with implication what 
implied very little".  
 There are yet other issues: "the fact that portions of our stories are hearsay, ... the fact 
that the autobiographer inevitably makes use of prevailing literary conventions, the fact that 
these conventions are themselves inseparable from prevailing cultural scripts". And then 
there are the failures of memory: "to the degree that autobiographical recollection departs 
from what 'really' was, in the 'past present' that it seeks, futilely, to recover, it must of 
necessity falsify experience" (ibid., p. 119).  
 Freeman does not deny the hopelessly (re)constructive nature of autobiography, but 
he still refuses to place the genre in the category of fiction, as he tries to seek a new concept 
of truth which is not simply bound to the reality of immediate experience (see chapter 2). 
 The question of how we remember is central to autobiography and indeed it has been 
a subject that both authors and critics have dealt with throughout the history of the genre. 
Early examples can be found in St. Augustine's The Confessions, written circa 398-400 AD 
and often taken to be the origin of modern Western autobiography (see Anderson, 2011, p. 
17). In one of his readings of St. Augustine, Olney (1998, p. 19) describes two models for 
memory. The first he calls the "archaeological model", which describes a view of memory as 
something fixed and static, portraying events as they occurred and merely suffering from "the 
decaying effects of time", such as when Augustine writes about "the fields and spacious 
palaces of memory, where lie the treasures of innumerable ... things" (in ibid.). In the 
"processual model", the metaphor changes from archaeological digging to weaving, 
suggesting that memory is always in process and always taking on new forms (ibid., p. 21): "I 
weave these remembered experiences together into likenesses of things of the past", 
Augustine writes (in ibid., p. 20).  
 Olney also finds in Augustine's texts references to how memory relates to story-
telling. In On the Trinity, he describes our capacity to combine "imaginary visions by taking 
pieces of recollection from here and there and, as it were, sewing them together" into a story 
(in ibid., p. 63). Here Augustine uses the weaving metaphor once again, suggesting that just 
as memory is always in process, so is the life narrative.  
 According to Olney (ibid., p. 20), the weaving metaphor would be used to describe 
the operation of memory for centuries to come (indeed, Singer and Blagov use it in a quote in 
section 4.2, and so does Hood in section 3.3). The processual model is more in accordance 
with the knowledge we have today on this subject. Still we can not see in Augustine, 
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according to Olney (ibid., p. 411), a deep preoccupation with what the written life narrative 
actually portrays; "to write a life ... never seemed to him an impossible undertaking".  
 This rather unproblematic view of the self and life-narratives changed considerably 
over the centuries, as Olney's following readings of Rousseau and Beckett attest (see ibid., 
pp. 413-414), but he still finds that some things remain the same: "For Augustine, Rousseau, 
and Beckett, memory enables and vitalizes narrative; in return, narrative provides form for 
memory, supplements it, and sometimes displaces it. These reciprocal relationships have not 
essentially changed in sixteen centuries" (ibid., p. 417). Bruner (2002, p. 4) confirms this 
description of the relationship between reality, memory and life story by writing that "we 
constantly construct and reconstruct our selves ... with the guidance of our memories of the 
past and our hopes and fears for the future", and that, at the same time, "our very  memories 
fall victim to our self-making stories".   
 
Autobiography scholars in recent history have been very much aware of the pitfalls of 
memory. In the beginning of the twentieth century, for instance, we find Georg Misch (1907, 
p. 69) saying that "It is an admitted psychological fact that remembrance does not proceed as 
mechanical reproduction but tends to creation. Hence autobiographies are not to be regarded 
as objective narratives". He proceeds by asserting that recollections might be affected by 
distorting influences and self-deception, and concludes that "autobiography is a field of auto-
delusion".  
 Gusdorf (1956, p. 85), another early critic, notes that autobiography is not some 
simple repetition of the past and that recollection "reveals no more than a ghostly image of 
[a] life, already far distant, and doubtless incomplete, distorted furthermore by the fact that 
the man who remembers his past has not been for a long time the same being ... who lived 
that past". 
 Pascal (1960, p. 70) thought of memory as "the most powerful unconscious agent in 
shaping the past according to the will of the writer". This realization, however, did not stop 
him from thinking that autobiography was "at its happiest" when it was solely based on 
(distant) memory, as in narratives of childhood, in which he believed we could better observe 
the process of self-discovery. Pascal acknowledged that these memories were not completely 
reliable, but he maintained that in autobiography one should be interested in the past "as it 
appears in [the author's] mind, in his present mind" (ibid., p. 71). The distortion of the 
historical past which inevitably happens in the process of recall was for him not only a 
characteristic of autobiography, but a "necessary condition of it" (ibid., p. 72). 
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 Scepticism only seemed to increase in the 1970's under the influence of post-
structuralism and deconstructionism. Scholars such as James Olney (1977, p. 241) reminded 
us that "we can recall what we were only from the complex perspective of what we are, 
which means that we may very well be recalling something that we never were at all", while 
Mandel (1980, p. 63) pointed out that "the past is always an illusion because it never really 
existed". 
 Some of the aforementioned theorists defended the idea that the reconstruction of past 
experience found in autobiographies had its own truth value, what Gusdorf called "a truth of 
the man" (1956, p. 89). Similarly (although in slightly more scientific than philosophical 
terms), Eakin (1992, p. 67) suggests that the "very impurities of memory—its fallibility, its 
proclivity for revisionist history—that may prove, paradoxically, to be redemptive, permitting 
(at least) the literary assertion of identity". The continuous reshaping of memory as the self 
moves forward in time allows, in other words, for the development of identity, which Eakin 
places at the heart of autobiography as a genre. I suppose this is somehow along the lines of  
what Gusdorf (1956, p. 89) meant when he wrote about "truth of facts" vs. "truth of the man": 
that autobiography is not simply a description of the past, but also "the attempt and the drama 
of a man struggling to reassemble himself in his own likeness at a certain moment of his 
history" (ibid., my italics). It seems to me like this reassembling that Gusdorf speaks of, is the 
very process of identity formation. 
 In spite of always having defended the idea that referentiality is central to literary 
autobiography, in a more recent article Eakin (2000, p. 290) writes that "memory, whether we 
like it or not, is one more source of fiction". Although he stresses that he does not mean to 
use the term "fiction" in a pejorative sense, he acknowledges nonetheless that 
autobiographies are based on recollections that are formed, fashioned, invented. As far as I 
can tell (and I provide other examples of this in chapter 6), this has been a fairly common 
view among autobiography scholars in the last two decades, and it is not difficult to see why 
Freeman suggests we need to rethink the terms "reality" and "fiction". 
 What makes Eakin's view somewhat distinct is that over the years he has drawn 
heavily on scientific research on the workings of consciousness. Although he does say that 
autobiographies are fictions, he contends that they are a different kind of fiction; a "memory-
based kind" (which is a bit of a truism). According to Eakin, developments in memory 
research should naturally have consequences for the study of autobiography. The 
developments he is talking about refer in most part to the realization that autobiographical 
memory is based on constant reconstruction, not on stored information that is simply 
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"brought forth" in the process of remembering. The extended self (or autobiographical self, as 
Damasio calls it), is thus a fiction of memory, Eakin argues (ibid., p. 297), and so is 
autobiography.  
 Although his field is psychology, McAdams (2001, p. 115) also talks about written 
life narratives in his life story model. He says that the "postmodern self is like a text, a 
narrative that continues to be written and rewritten over time" and acknowledges that the 
notion of identity is problematic: "Because all texts are indeterminate, no single life can 
really mean a single thing, no organizing pattern of identity can be validly discerned in any 
single human life" (ibid.). I have been trying to argue against the idea of the unified story and 
the coherent self as mere "myths" (ref. the closing passage of section 3.5). As McAdams 
suggests, the self has a vital integrative function on experience which seems to be highly 
relevant for literary studies. This is by no means to say that literary critics have been wrong 
all along. As McAdams also notes,  
...the postmodern emphasis on multiplicity is consistent with a number of trends in social, cognitive, 
developmental, and evolutionary psychology today, all emphasizing the particularity, modularity, and 
domain specificity of human functioning. Nonetheless, a totally modular view of selfhood would seem 
too extreme, given people's phenomelonological experiences of, at minimum, some degree of 
integration in daily life and given the naturally integrative power of narrative itself. (ibid.,  p. 116) 
Although one person can create diverse narratives in the course of a lifetime, many 
psychologists agree that identity is formed through narrative and that it creates unit and 
purpose in life. Life stories are furthermore characterized (as we've seen in section 4.3) by 
coherence. It seems to me that coherence and unity are the very foundation of who we are, 
the very basis without which the idea of identity—and autobiography—would be 
impracticable. This relates to Eakin's suggestion that memory's fallibility may be redemptive 
in the sense that it helps us maintain the feeling of being the "same", i.e. of having an identity 
(Eakin, 2000, p. 293).   
 
Roy Pascal suggested back in 1960 (p. 67), and I agree, that there are two kinds of truth in 
autobiography: the truth of fact and the truth of the author's feeling, and "where the two 
coincide cannot be decided by any outside authority in advance". Even though factual truth is 
not the focus of my argumentation, I have still found relevant to discuss memory and its 
reputation as an unreliable source of knowledge. I've done this mainly because I feel that 
some critics and authors view this as a reason to suggest that autobiographies falsify 
experience and therefore are quick to equate them with fiction. In The Story I Tell Myself 
(1997), for instance, late author Hazel Barnes writes that her efforts to write about her own 
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life "have painfully confirmed [her] theoretical awareness of the degree to which an 
autobiography is perforce a novel" (in Freeman, 2003, p. 117). And autobiography scholar 
Claire Lynch  (2010, p. 209) says that "although [autobiography] appears to be comprised of 
facts, it is very often mainly fictional" (I explore this more in depth in chapter 6).  
 In the last few years, Smith and Watson (2010, p. 22) have reaffirmed the 
longstanding fact that "narrated memory is an interpretation of a past that can never be fully 
recovered", since recall is not "mere retrieval from a memory bank" (ibid.), but a process of 
continuous reconstruction and reinterpretation. This agrees with neurobiological accounts of 
memory such as Damasio's (1999, p. 220) when he says that the brain "forms memories in a 
highly distributed manner". He also underscores the influence of our past history and beliefs 
in the formation of memories and says, as I quoted earlier, that "perfectly faithful memory is 
a myth" (2010, p. 133). Either way, in our minds we still distinguish between what we feel is 
our past and what is not: "The portrayal in the nonverbal narrative simultaneously creates and 
reveals the protagonist, connects the actions being produced by the organism to that same 
protagonist, and, along with the feeling generated by engaging with the object, engenders a 
sense of ownership" (ibid., p. 203). 
 According to Rubin, Schrauf and Greenberg (2003, p. 888), a "full-blown 
autobiographical memory requires the integrative memory system, at least one modality-
specific type of imagery (usually visual imagery), and, to varying degrees, spatial imagery, 
imagery in the other senses, narrative reasoning and emotions". More importantly, they note 
that a sense of "reliving" of the original experience is central to autobiographical memory 
(ibid., p. 887). According to Conway (1996, p. 70), research has shown that sensory 
knowledge could be "the key feature that distinguishes memory for experienced events from 
memory for imagined events."  
 These and other similar findings suggest that event specific knowledge is central to 
autobiographical memories, and may play a critical role in convincing us that we in fact 
"remembered" an event (ibid.). As Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000, p. 263) later phrased 
it, "ESK and the imagery to which it gives rise are critical in leading a rememberer to believe 
the truth of his or her memories". 
 Why is this relevant? Smith and Watson (2010, p. 17) describe a shift in the field of 
literary studies regarding the way we read autobiographies: "from assessing and verifying 
knowledge to observing processes of communicative exchange and understanding". This is 
precisely what I am attempting to do. Instead of looking at whether the elements of a story 
are true or false, I've been trying to focus more on what makes the reader—and the author—
45 
distinguish between an autobiography and a work of fiction; not on a case-to-case basis, but 
in general. In other words, what makes us hang on to the notion that there is a difference 
between fiction and non-fiction, between an autobiography and a novel, despite academic 
discussions that put this notion under scrutiny?  
 I ended chapter 3 with the following question: "Is it really that naïve and 
inconceivable that an autobiographical text could have anything to do with a life story or a 
coherent self?" In the present chapter, I have outlined studies which suggest that we need a 
basic, unified sense of self (what in Damasio is referred to as core self) in order to generate 
autobiographical memories. Autobiographical memories in turn are what allow us to build 
life stories in our brains that give us a sense of personhood and identity (Damasio's 
autobiographical self).  These "self narratives" are something we all build, regardless of 
whether we, at some point, choose to put them in writing. From the point of view of the 
author, the act of writing may indeed contribute to a reshaping of the life story. That seems to 
me, however, to be a natural, ongoing process which occurs not only through the somewhat 
performative act of text-making, but also through speech, social interactions, remembering, et 
cetera. The important observation here is that we would probably not write about our life 
stories if we didn't experience ourselves as one person with a life story to begin with. I 
believe this is not only the reason why we attempt to write about our lives, but also the reason 
why we think other people can do it, i.e. why we believe in the latent legitimacy of 
autobiography as a genre of literature. 
 In the next chapter, I will be reading Graciliano Ramos' Infância, which the author 
himself labeled an autobiography of childhood (see section 2.4), in order to try to spot which 
elements in the text resonate with the way we experience our selves and our life stories 
according to what I have outlined in the previous chapters. I will also be looking at how a few 
critics have read this book, to see if there is anything that would suggest that this process of 




5 Graciliano Ramos and the self narrative 
Graciliano Ramos' Infância was published for the first time in 1945, in an anthology entitled 
Memórias, Diários e Confissões. It covers the first eleven years of the author's life, starting 
with, as he writes in the very first lines, the first memory he can conjure up: "um vaso de 
louça vidrada, cheio de pitombas, escondido atrás de uma porta" (p. 23).11 According to 
Karpa-Wilson (2005, p. 160), Ramos initially wrote several of the book's chapters as 
individual stories, which he published in newspapers beginning in 1938.  
 Throughout the book, Ramos paints a picture of the places, people and experiences 
that appear to have had significance in his life. A great deal of attention, not surprisingly, is 
given to the relationship between the protagonist and his parents; more specifically their role 
in the sense of fear that the author claims to have followed him throughout his life: "Mêdo. 
Foi o mêdo que me orientou nos primeiros anos, pavor" (p. 28).12 Indeed, some of his most 
vivid memories have a theme of physical abuse, such as the chapters "Um cinturão",13 which 
I deal with in more detail in section 5.2, and "O Inferno":14 
Os golpes que recebi antes do caso do cinturão, puramente físicos, desapareciam quando findava a dor. 
Certa vez minha mãe surrou-me com uma corda nodosa que me pintou as costas de manchas sangrentas 
(p. 45).15  
Minha mãe curvou-se, descalçou-se e aplicou-me várias chineladas. Não me convenci. Conservei-me 
dócil, tentando acomodar-me às esquisitices alheias. Mas algumas vêzes fui sincero, idiotamente. E 
vieram-me chineladas e outros castigos oportunos (p. 95).16  
 
His relationship to literature and the exercise of reading is almost equally important (he 
became, after all, an author). An example can be found in the chapter named "O fim do 
mundo":17                                                         11  "...  a  glazed  china  vase,  filled  with  pitomba  fruit,  hidden  behind  a  door"  (p.  21).  Citations  in  Portuguese  with references containing only page number are from Ramos (1969) and the English translation of these citations is from Ramos (1979). Portuguese is my mother tongue, but for practical reasons I am choosing to use (with discernment) an existing translation. 12 "Fear. It was fear that guided me during my first years, real [dread]." (p. 25) 13 "A broad belt" 14 "Hell" 15 "The blows I received before they used the broad belt on me were purely physical and disappeared [once] the pain ended. Once my mother beat me so hard with a knotted rope that my back was painted with bloody spots." (p. 36) 16 "My mother bent over, took off her bed‐slippers, and spanked me several times. I wasn't convinced. I remained docile, trying to accomodate myself to the peculiarit[ies] of others. But sometimes I was sincere, like a fool. And the blows [with] bed‐slippers and other timely punishments descended on me." (p. 66) 17 "The end of the world" 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Minha mãe lia devagar, numa toada inexpressiva, fazendo pausas absurdas, engolindo vírgulas e 
pontos, abolindo esdrúxulas, alongando ou encurtando palavras. Não compreendia bem o sentido delas. 
E, com tal prosódia e tal pontuação, os textos mais simples se obscureciam.  
 Essas deturpações me afastaram do exercício penoso, verdadeiro enigma. Isso e o aspecto 
desagradável do romance de quatro volumes, enxovalhado e rôto, que as vizinhas soletravam, achando 
intenções picarescas nas gravuras sôltas, onde a tinta esmorecia, sob nódoas (p. 53).18  
  
His experiences in primary school are no less painful, both psychologically and physically: 
Trouxeram-me roupa nova de fustão branco. Tentaram calçar-me os borzeguins amarelos: os pés 
tinham crescido e não houve meio de reduzi-los. Machucaram-me, comprimiram-me os ossos. As 
meias rasgavam-se, os borzeguins estavam secos, minguados. Não senti esfoladuras e advertências. As 
barbas do professor eram imponentes, os músculos do professor deviam ser tremendos. ... Enorme 
tristeza por não perceber nenhuma simpatia em redor. Arranjavam impiedosos o sacrifício — e eu me 
deixava arrastar, mole e resignado, rês infeliz antevendo o matadouro (p. 128).19  
At the risk of sounding tautological, I should note that one of the things that most 
characterizes Ramos' narrative is that he makes it clear that we are here dealing first and 
foremost with the process of remembering, and he describes this process comprehensively. I 
presume that that triggers the reader to open up to the possibility of autobiography and to 
think about how the process of remembering occurs in his/her mind.  
 The question of accuracy in remembering is also an issue, since childhood memories 
are much more difficult to verify, both for third-persons and for the author him/herself. When 
childhood is narrated in a more literary fashion, the critic "is faced with the uncomfortable 
task of deciding what is autobiography and what is something else" (Coe, 1984, p. 3). 
However, as I've said before, I do not intend to find in Graciliano Ramos' childhood 
autobiography which passages are loyal to events as they happened in real life and which are 
mere constructions. A person's autobiography can only be built and accessed via that person's 
conscious mind, and, as we all know by experience, consciousness is an "entirely private, 
first-person phenomenon" (Damasio, 1999, p. 12).  
 It is additionally not the goal of this paper to deal with truth and falsity as these two 
terms are traditionally defined. In this aspect, I side with Lejeune (1973, p. 311), who argues 
that even if a story "is, historically, completely false, it will be on the order of the lie ... and                                                         18 "My mother read slowly in an inexpressive manner, making absurd pauses, swallowing commas and full‐stops, abolishing the [proparoxytones], elongating or shortening the words. She didn't understand their meaning very well. And, with such prosody and such punctuation, the simplest texts became obscure.   These distortions drew me away from the painful exercise, a true enigma. This and the unpleasant look of the four‐volume novel, stained and cracked, which the neighbourhood ladies would read haltingly, word by word, findind ridiculous intentions in the loose pictures, where the ink grew faint, forming stains." (p. 60) 19 "They brought me some new clothes made of white cotton. They tried to put me in the yellow high‐laced boots: my feet had grown and there was no way to reduce them. The boots hurt me, pressing on my bones. My socks were being torn, the high‐laced boots were dry and shrunken. I didn't feel the blisters or the warnings. The teacher's beard was imposing, his muscles must have been tremendous. ... A great sadness because I didn't perceive any sympathy around me. They mercilessly arranged the sacrifice — and I let myself be dragged, weak and resigned, an unhappy lamb anticipating the slaughterhouse." (p. 87) 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not of fiction". I am here only dealing with the similarities between any person's patterns of 
remembering and self-reference and the ones expressed in written life narratives. 
 My goal is to show what about Ramos' narrative makes me conceive of it as a 
possible attempt in the author's part to write about his life. In other words, I am not trying to 
find out what makes an autobiography non-fictional, but what makes the reader feel that a 
text shows a "real person" writing about "his individual life, in particular the story of his 
personality" (ref. ibid., p. 298). 
5.1 Who is 'I'?  
Where could I start to look for the roots of referentiality in this supposed autobiography? I 
choose to start at the most basic level. In his attempt to define autobiography as a genre, 
Lejeune (1973, p. 299) also starts with the fundamental: "[t]he identity of the narrator and the 
principal character that is assumed in autobiography is marked most often by the use of the 
first person." I think it is safe to say that  first person perspective is the most basic element of 
the self-narrative in the mind which can be incorporated into an autobiography by the use of 
the first person pronoun. Some authors, of course, have experimented with the genre. Adriana 
Cavarero (2000, pp. 81-82) writes, for example, about how Gertrude Stein "succeeds 
notoriously in disturbing the fundamental tenets of the autobiographical genre." Her The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas is "an autobiography of Gertrude Stein, written by 
Gertrude, where Gertrude herself appears in the text, however, as a character narrated by 
Alice." Rachel Gabara (2006, p. 157) writes about a "Western tradition of third-person 
autobiography", citing works by Giambattista Vico and Henry Adams, as well as about 
francophone autobiographers such as Assia Djebar, who have played with conventions. Just 
to cite a few examples.  
 That being said, I think it is safe to say that no one (at least no one without a disorder 
or a brain injury) thinks about themselves and their life stories without taking the point-of-
view of an "I". William James (1890, p. 238) wrote in his The Principles of Psychology, that 
consciousness is continuous and one: "[w]hat now is the common whole? The natural name 
for it is myself, I, or me." As I quoted earlier in this chapter, consciousness is a first-person 
phenomenon, and Damasio stresses that "[y]ou know you exist because the narrative exhibits 
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you as a protagonist in the act of knowing" (1999, p. 172).20  The "I",  what Roland Barthes 
has called the "pronoun of the imaginary" (in Eakin, 1992, p. 6), is actually one of the most 
fundamental expressions of the self in consciousness. The textual "I", as Lejeune (1973, p. 
302) has noted, naturally leads the reader to ask "who is 'I'?", which is one of the first steps in 
the process of verification seeking.  
 The textual expression of the self knowing comes, naturally enough, in the very first 
line: "A primeira coisa que guardei na memória foi um vaso de louça vidrada" (p. 23; my 
italics).21 Here, the Portuguese verb guardar (in this case meaning "to store", as in memory) 
appears in the first person, past tense, which is also the form of telling in the rest of the book. 
The verb expresses both a feeling of ownership (that the "I" who is speaking knows objects 
are represented in his mind), as well as agency relative to the objects being represented in 
memory. There is a sense that the self is actively storing and retrieving the memories in 
question (it would be odd to say, for example, that something was stored in our memory 
instead of saying we stored something in memory). Similarly, Ramos writes things like "A 
recordação dessa antiga cena mostra-me a casa virada..." (p. 59),22 which declare that the 
book deals with a narrator's process of remembering his own past. 
 There is, right from the start, a clear sense of perspective, i.e. the mind's standpoint of 
viewing, touching, hearing, et cetera, which is the body (ref. Damasio, 2010, p. 185); for 
instance in "...percebí muitas caras, palavras insensatas" (p. 23).23 Another passage in which 
perspective is easily discernible can be found when Ramos recalls gazing upon the victim of 
a house fire, in the chapter entitled "Um incêndio":24  
Faltava-lhe o cabelo, faltava a pele — e não havendo seios nem sexo, perdiam-se os restos da 
animalidade. A superfície vestia-se de crostas, como a dos metais inúteis, carcomidos no abandono e na 
ferrugem. En alguns pontos semelhava carne assada, e havia realmente um cheiro forte de carne 
assada; (...) Não enxerguei pormenores: vi apenas, de relance, a dentadura, as órbitas vazias, o fluxo 
purulento.  
 Mudei a vista, arredei-me engulhando, amaldiçoando José, que me expusera a enorme                                                         20  Interestingly, Damasio  (1999, p.351n3) acknowledges briefly  in an endnote  that one may question whether  the nonverbal account which he describes as the self and knowing are illusions or fictions. Damasio's answer is clear: he does not think they are fictional. "After all," he writes, "we do come to verify independently, a posteriori, in our beings and in other beings, that the kinds of characters in the primordial plot, e.g. the living individual organisms, the objects and  the  relationships  portrayed  in  the  plot  are  in  fact  consistent,  systematic,  and widespread  occurences.  In  that sense  they  are not  fictional  because  they  respect  a  relative  truth  standard"—although he doesn't  believe  they  can depict any absolute truth.   21 "The first thing that remained in my memory was a glazed china vase" (p. 21).  22 "The memory of this old scene brings back to me the house turned in different directions..." (p. 44) 23 "I perceived many faces, foolish words" (p. 21) 24 "A fire" (p. 70) 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desgraça... (p. 106).25 
The passage above is also a good example of the importance of visual imagery, which Rubin, 
Schrauf and Greenberg (2003, p. 889) say is "[t]he most important of the component 
processes involved in having and reporting an autobiographical memory that has been 
reported in the psychological and philosophical literatures".  
 Dennett writes about a so-called intentional stance. The term refers to children's 
ability to "experience the world from the subjective standpoint of an intentional, causal 
agent" (in McAdams, 2001, p. 104), thereby appropriating experience as their own. This 
happens when children are about two years of age. By the time they are three or four, the 
process of "mind-reading" begins, which means that they start attributing mental states to 
other people as well. When the feeling of "I" is in place, the objective self, or "self-as-me", 
can develop. Citing Howe and Courage (1997, in ibid.), McAdams says that it is somewhere 
between the second and the third years of life that autobiographical memory emerges: 
Although infants can remember events (basic episodic memory) before this time, it is not until the end 
of the 2nd year ... that episodic memory becomes personalized and children begin to organize events 
that they experience as "things that happened to me". From this point onward, the me expands to 
include autobiographical recollections, recalled as little stories about what has transpired in "my life". 
(ibid.) 
If we go back to Lejeune, he goes on to draw a parallel between the personal pronoun "I" and 
the speaker at the moment of discourse.  
 Person and discourse are linked, according to Lejeune (1973, p. 305), by means of the 
proper name. "For the reader, who does not know the real person [behind a discourse], all the 
while believing in his existence, the author is defined as the person capable of producing this 
discourse, and so he imagines what he is like from what he produces" (my italics).  
 I agree with Lejeune on this point and I think his use of the adjective capable is in 
accord with my idea of the reader being open to the possibility that there can be a self-
writing-about-self, if I can put it this way. The difference here is that I don't place so much 
weight on the proper name. In the process of verification, the proper name will naturally be 
an important factor; as Lejeune writes (ibid.), "it is ... in relation to the proper name that we 
are able to situate the problems of autobiography". Even so, I am more concerned with how 
an autobiography can be written in a way that triggers the reader to believe that there may be                                                         25 "It lacked hair, it lacked skin — and not having breasts nor sex, it lost the rest of its animal characteristics. The surface was covered with a crust, like that of old metal abandoned to decay. In some places, it was similar to roasted beef; and there was really a strong smell of roast beef; (...) I didn't see the details: I only saw with a quick glance the teeth, the empty eye‐sockets, and the flow of pus. I averted my eyes, moving away nauseated, cursing José who had exposed me to this enormous disgrace..." (pp. 72‐73) 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a real person to which the narrated events refer to, i.e. that they are written by a self 
describing the mental images which this self has feelings of ownership, agency and 
perspective towards.  
 Damasio (2010, p. 8) explains that what allows a self to know its own mind, body, 
past, present and "all the rest—is the perception that any of these items generates emotions 
and feelings, and, in turn, the feelings accomplish the separation between contents that 
belong to the self and those that do not". These feelings of knowing, which Damasio calls 
"somatic markers", are what indicate a distinction between self and non-self.  
 This is important in this setting from two perspectives. An author must inevitably 
have the same sense of self vs. non-self; he or she may attempt to express the contents of his 
or her mind which refer to the self with varying degrees of, for lack of a better term, "non-self 
smudging". In cases in which the author remembers his or her past, the events narrated may 
or may not correspond to historical reality, but the author will still place them in the "objects 
that belong to the self" category. The other perspective is that of the readers, who equally 
distinguish between self and non-self and therefore know that the author does the same thing.  
 Ross and Newby (1996, p. 174) contend that people use certain criteria to assess their 
own and other people's memories. One of these criteria is congruence with other knowledge 
and experiences. They say that we "examine a memory to determine if the details agree with 
[our] previous experiences and with [our] knowledge of the world and people." This criterion 
is often invoked when we evaluate both our own and other people's memories and, I believe, 
it is also invoked when we read autobiographies.  
 
5.2 Three levels of autobiographical knowledge 
How would I as a reader go through this process of evaluation with Ramos' narrative? Before 
I turn my focus to Infância, I would like to briefly look at a reading of another literary 
autobiography to illustrate the aforementioned idea of congruence (at least my interpretation 
of it). I am talking about Daniel L. Schacter's use of Isabel Allende's autobiography Paula to 
illustrate how memory works. Beyond the autobiographical pact, which I presume 
contributed to Schacter's choice of this book, I find it interesting to read what sort of elements 
in a text would lead a memory scholar to "buy into" the veracity of Allende's account.  
 One of the most relevant things Schacter (1996, p. 89) says is that "[d]espite the 
complexity of our personal memories, our autobiographical recollections also contain a good 
deal of underlying structure". This "underlying structure" is precisely what I argue that we as 
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readers use as a basis in the process of verification which occurs either when we read (a) a 
text that appears to be an expression of a person's recollection process, or (b) a text which we 
are told, by means of the autobiographical pact, is an expression of a person's recollection 
process. 
 Schacter may perhaps have taken for granted that Allende intended to write 
autobiographically. The title of the book is, after all, Paula. A Memoir.26 The proper name 
which is so important to Lejeune's autobiographical pact is also an indication of the author's 
intention: in the book, Isabel Allende is the protagonist, the author and the narrator. There is 
also identity of name between the characters in the book and the people in Allende's life, like 
the Paula in the title, Allende's deceased daughter; just to name a few of the connections 
between the author's life and the narrated events in the book.  
 But there is another feature of the text that is more relevant to my argumentation: 
Schacter (ibid.) writes that "Allende's remembered autobiography is a lot like everybody 
else's recollections of their lives: a complex tapestry that includes memories of specific 
moments and more general recollections of larger chuncks of time." Here he is referring to 
some of the theories I have outlined in chapter 4, which, to recapitulate, suggest that 
experiences are constructed in memory by combining three levels of autobiographical 
knowledge: lifetime periods, general events and specific episodes.  
 Going back to Ramos' text, then, we should be able to identify at least some of its 
"underlying structure".  
 The chapter called "Verão"27 (already cited briefly in chapter 2) is an interesting 
example of the combination of different forms of autobiographical knowledge, which as 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000, p. 262) note, "is highly characteristic (if not defining) of 
the recall of specific autobiographical memories":  
Dêsse antigo verão que me alterou a vida restam ligeiros traços apenas. E nem dêles posso afirmar que 
efetivamente me recorde. O hábito me leva a criar um ambiente, imaginar fatos a que atribuo realidade. 
Sem dúvida as árvores se despojaram e se enegreceram, o açude estancou, as porteiras dos currais se 
abriram, inúteis. É sempre assim (p. 40).28   
                                                         26  I  should note  that Lejeune does not  consider memoir  to be a  form of  autobiography, but  rather a genre closely 
related to autobiography (see Lejeune, 1989, p. 298). Since both deal with a real person's personal past, (and since I am not dealing with specific genre definition issues), I will here be placing them in the same category of non‐fictional autobiographical writing. 27 "Summer" 28 "From this old summer which changed my life very few traces remain. And I really couldn't say for sure that I remember them. Habit makes me create an atmosphere in which I imagine facts that become reality. Undoubtedly trees lost their leaves and grew darker, the water stopped running over the dam, the gates of the corrals were left open, useless. It is always like that" (p. 33) 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In this passage, Ramos starts, like many of us do, by recalling general events. According to 
Schacter (1996, p. 90), general events appear to be "natural entry points into our 
autobiographical memories", precisely because of the benefits of repetition, which Ramos 
acknowledges when he underscores that he remembers that trees lost their leaves and the 
gates of the corrals were left open because "it is always like that".  
 Soon enough, these general events lead to memories of specific episodes: "Um dia 
faltou água em casa. Tive sêde e recomendaram-me paciência. A carga de ancoretas chegaria 
logo. Tardou, a fonte era distante — e fiquei horas numa agonia, rondando o pote, com brasas 
na língua. Essa dor esquisita perturbou-me em excesso" (p. 41).29  
 A lifetime period can be identified in the chapter's title, namely that one Summer. The 
whole book could in fact be said to cover a distinct lifetime period for Ramos: childhood, as 
the title of the book makes clear, with other shorter lifetime periods overlapping each other 
within the story. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000, p. 262) explain that lifetime periods 
"represent general knowledge of significant others, common locations, actions, activities, 
plans, and goals, characteristic of a period". They also say that these extensive chunks of time 
have "identifiable beginnings and endings", although these may be fuzzy.  
 As Ashley Brown (in Ramos, 1979, p. 7) writes in the introduction to the English 
edition of Infância, the book begins when the infant Graciliano Ramos is taken to his 
maternal grandparents' ranch in the state of Pernambuco. The beginning of this period is 
marked in the text: "Tïnhamos deixado a cidadezinha onde vivíamos, em Alagoas, e 
entrávamos no sertão de Pernambuco, eu, meu pai, minha mãe, duas irmãs" (p. 25).30 Then 
there is the time when the family settles in the small town of Buíque (which starts with the 
chapter "Chegada à vila",31 p. 58), only to move yet again a few years later to Viçosa (which 
he describes in the chapter called "Mudança",32 p. 183). Many of the lifetime periods 
described in the book are therefore linked to a place, "When I lived at x". 
 Additionaly, the most extensive lifetime period described, the time when he was a 
child, has its beginning and ending relatively clearly marked. The book starts with the boy's 
first memories, which he estimates are from when he was two or three years old, and ends                                                         29 "One day there was no water in the house. I was thirsty and I was told to be patient. A load of ... water kegs would arrive soon. It took a long time, the spring was at some distance — and I stayed in agony for hours, prowling around the jug with embers on my tongue. This exquisite pain disturbed me excessively." (p. 34) 30 "We had left the little town where we lived, in Alagoas, and reached the backlands of Pernambuco, I, my father, my mother, my two sisters" (p. 22) 31 "The arrival at the village" (p. 43) 32 "Moving" (p. 120) 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with a transition from childhood into early pubescence, with descriptions of physical changes 
and, in the very last scenes, a visit to a prostitute named Otília da Conceição: "Otília da 
Conceição, à beira da cama, esperava em silêncio. Arriei sôbre a mala pequena e, em silêncio 
também, comecei a descalçar-me" (p. 273).33  
 Another example of a distict memory is the day when Ramos and his parents went to 
visit a neighbouring farmer. The chapter, entitled "Uma bebedeira" (p. 50)34, starts with a 
seemingly vivid image of the author's mother, "posta de meia esguelha, envôlta na saia 
comprida e larga, uma perna prêsa no gancho do silhão" (ibid.).35 His father is described as 
"todo pachola, boa lança mas cavalhadas, viajando no preceito, como quem executa um 
dever" (ibid.).36 Also here, Ramos is very specific about which events he remembers and 
which he doesn't, as in "Ignoro como chegamos à fazenda: as minhas recordações datam da 
hora em que entramos na sala. Meu pai e o proprietário sumiram-se... Minha mãe e eu 
ficamos cercados de saias" (p. 51).37 Considering that Ramos was a little boy, it seems natural 
that he would hang on to the visual memory of the "skirts" surrounding him. 
 Interestingly, Ramos shows an awareness of the fact that repeated events may lead us 
to incorporate their details into specific memories: when the ladies give his mother some 
liqueur, Ramos remembers that she "tocou a linha esquiva dos beiços naquela surprêsa que 
tingia a substância rara, cruzou as mãos, franziu a boca numa tentativa de agradecimento";38 
but then he notes that "Com rigor, não me seria possível afirmar que tais gestos de 
realizaram. Surpreendi-os, contudo, em visitas posteriores e arrisco-me a referi-los" (p. 52).39  
 The apparent reason why the memories of this day have persevered appears to be that 
this was the first time the author remembers drinking alcohol: "Quem me deu o primeiro 
cálice de licor foi a morena vistosa, mas não sei quem deu o segundo" (p. 55).40 From the                                                         33 "Beside the bed Otília da Conceição waited  in silence. I dropped on the little trunk and, also in silence, began to take off my shoes" (p. 174). 34 "A Drunken Spree" (p. 39) 35 "sitting sideways, dressed in a long, loose skirt, with one leg placed in the hook of the sidesaddle" (ibid.) 36 "very swanky, as though he were riding in a joust, executing his part according to the rules" (ibid.) 37 "I don't remember our arrival at the farm: my memory dates from the hour when we entered the room. My father and the proprietor disappeared... My mother and I stayed behind, surrounded by skirts" (p. 40) 38 "tinted the disdainful line of her lips with this rare substance, crossed her hands, and curled her mouth in an attempt to be grateful" (p. 41) 39 "Strictly speaking, it isn't possible to affirm that such gestures took place. I caught them, however, during my later visits, and I hesitate to refer to them" (ibid.) 40 "The one who gave me [the] first glass of liqueur was the good‐looking brunette, but I don't know who gave me the second" (ibid.) 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perspective of Ramos, the adult, however, he admits that this might not have been the first 
time: "Suponho que não foi a primeira vez que me embriagaram. As sertanejas do Nordeste 
entorpecem os filhos à noite com uma garrafa de vinho forte" (p. 56).41 
 What I have just described are a few examples of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's 
(2000, p. 262) proposed model: "ESK details are contextualized within a general event that in 
turn is associated with one or more lifetime periods that locate the more specific knowledge 
within an individual's autobiographical memory as a whole." 
5.3 Authenticity and the process behind remembering 
Where else do we find congruence between what is described and what we know about our 
own way of organizing our personal past? I think some of it has to do with his detailed 
descriptions of the recollection and storytelling processes underlying the text. A lot of it 
resonates with how we remember things about ourselves.   
 The author's awareness of the process of creating coherence, which can lead to 
memory distortion, is noteworthy: 
Certas coisas existem por derivação e associação; repetem-se, impõe-se — e, em letra de fôrma, tomam 
consistência, ganham raízes. Dificilmente pintaríamos um verão nordestino em que os ramos não 
estivessem prêtos e as cacimbas vazias. Reunimos elementos considerados indispensáveis, jogamos 
com êles, e se desprezamos alguns, o quadro parece incompleto (pp. 40-41).42 
 
Eakin (2000, pp. 291-292) writes that "autobiographers rarely dramatize the working of 
memory itself as a process", instead subscribing to a "simple notion of memory as a 
storehouse in which the past is preserved intact". I don't know how true this statement really 
is, but Ramos shows a great level of reflection when he explains how he remembers episodes 
and how they fit into his life story. This is in tune with normal adults' experience of distant 
memories as often unclear and unreliable (ref. section 4.4 on memory's fallibility). For 
instance, he writes about the reconstructive nature of memory: "Assim, não conservo a 
lembrança de uma alfaia esquisita, mas a reprodução dela, corroborada por indivíduos que lhe 
                                                        41 "I suppose that this wasn't the first time that they got me drunk. The women of the North‐eastern backlands quiet their children at night with a bottle of strong wine" (p. 42) 42 "Certain things exist by derivation and association; they repeat themselves, impose themselves—and in print they take consistency, gain roots. We can scarcely picture a Northeastern summer in which the branches wouldn't be dark and the waterholes empty. We combine elements considered indispensable, we play with them, and if we disregard some, the frame would seem incomplete." (ibid.). 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fixaram o conteúdo e a forma" (p. 23).43  
 
The text starts, conventionally enough, with the author's earliest memories. Described in the 
first chapter, these memories are extremely hazy and the author is accordingly very uncertain 
about their accuracy. About the memory of the "china vase" which was mentioned earlier in 
this section, Ramos writes "Ignoro onde o vi, quando o vi, e se uma parte do caso remoto não 
desaguasse noutro posterior, julgá-lo-ia sonho. Talvez nem me recorde bem do vaso: é 
possível que a imagem, brilhante e esguia, permaneça por eu a ter comunicado a pessoas que 
a confirmaram" (p. 23).44 This particular memory lacks contextual knowledge of where or 
when, which leads to uncertainty about its accuracy.  
 For a reader the narrative may sound more convincing precisely when Ramos 
expresses the uncertainty in the process of remembering, such as when he describes his 
mother's use of "vague expressions". This is quite an interesting passage and I will therefore 
allow myself to include a long citation: 
... tributo, papa-rato, maluquices que vêm, fogem, tornam a voltar. Tento arredá-las, pensar no açude, 
nos mergulhões, nas cantigas de José Baía, mas os diaparates me perseguem. Lentamente adquirem 
sentido e uma história se esboça: 
 Acorde, seu papa... 
 
Papa que? Julgo a princípio que se trata de papa-figo, vejo que me engano, lembro-me de papa-rato e 
finalmente de papa-hóstia. É papa-hóstia, sem dúvida: 
 Acorde, seu Papa-hóstia, 
 Nos braços de... 
 
Nova pausa. Três ou quatro sílabas manhosas dissimulam-se obstinadas. Despontam algumas, que 
experimento e abandono, imprestáveis. Enquanto procuro desviar as idéias, a impertinência se insinua 
no meu espírito, arrasta-me para a sala escura, cheia de abóboras. Sùbitamente as fugitivas aparecem e 
com elas o início da narrativa: 
 Acorde, seu Papa-hóstia, 
 Nos braços de Folgazona.  
(...) 
 
Vacilo um minuto, buscando cá por dentro a forma exata da composição. Persuado-me enfim de que 
minha dizia: 




I think many of us would identify with this way of remembering things people said long time 
ago. The confusion ("foolish things like these that come and go"), the many attempts at 
remembering ("...fig-eater ... rat-eater and finally Host-eater"), and finally the feeling of 
remembering ("Suddenly the fugitive words emerge..."), of which the person conscious of 
memory's fallibility can never be totally sure of ("I persuade myself then that my mother used 
to say...").  
 The way other people influence what we remember is also an issue for Ramos: "... e 
no fim do pátio cresciam árvores enormes, carregadas de pitombas. Alguém mudou as 
pitombas em laranjas. Não gostei da correção: laranjas, provavelmente já vistas, nada 
significavam" (p. 24).46 By acknowlegding the many ways in which memory can fail and the 
past can be shaped in ways that do not necessarily reflect historical reality, Ramos seems to 
neutralize my need for further verification of the truth. It is useless, and he knows it. Again 
the description of how he remembers an episode and how uncertain he is about the output of 
his memory, resonates with me. I am not the only one who has noted this when reading an 
autobiography. Roy Pascal, for example, writing about errors of fact in autobiographies, 
gives a couple of examples of autobiographers who make mistakes and leave them intact in 
the text, alongside the correction. "Clearly what they felt is that their false impression was as 
important as the truth, and that the autobiographer has to tell us as much what the writer is as 
what the facts were" (Pascal, 1960, p. 68). Implicit here, I think, is Pascal's own notion that 
we are prone to remember or interpret things incorrectly in our own life and that the 
autobiographer's admission of this human weakness (if I can call it that), makes the 
autobiography all the more authentic.  
 







so interwoven with personal memories that when we recall an event, we believe we are retrieving a 
reliable episode from our history, like opening a photograph album and examining a snapshot in time. 
If we then discovery (sic) the episode never really happened, then our whole self is called into 
question. But that's only because we are so committed to the illusion that our self is a reliable story in 
the first place. 
Ramos' autobiography shows a somewhat more nuanced picture of how this process occurs. 
For some key events of our lives, it may shatter our sense of identity to find out that we 
remembered something incorrectly. For instance, if someone whose identity is shaped by the 
experience of having suffered abuse as a child suddenly found out that their memories of the 
abuse were fabricated or induced by therapy. But the idea that we all just assume that "our 
self is a reliable story" is not entirely true, as the reading of Ramos suggests. Like Ramos, 
most of us accept that not everything we remember has its roots in the reality of the "there 
and then". And, actually, an autobiography in which this element of uncertainty is 
acknowledged will probably seem more convincing to a reader than one that does not.  
 Lejeune deals with this issue when he introduces the "referential pact". Instead of the 
contract sealed by the "I, undersigned" utterance, the referential pact encompasses a kind of 
oath to tell the truth, "the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" (Lejeune, 1973, p. 316). The 
interesting thing, however, is that Lejeune emphasizes that a restriction of this oath to the 
possible serves in fact as a supplementary proof of honesty: 
(the truth such as it appears to me, inasmuch as I can know it, etc., making allowances for lapses of 
memory, errors, involuntary distortions, etc.), and to indicate explicitly the field to which this oath applies 
(the truth about such and such an aspect of my life, not committing myself in any way about some other 
aspect) (ibid., p. 317) 
 
Furthermore, Lejeune notes (like Eakin, ref. section 2.4) that the reader accepts a certain 
amount of fiction without throwing the work as a whole in the same category: "The 
referential pact can be, according to the criteria of the reader, badly kept,  without the 
referential value of the text disappearing (on the contrary)" (ibid.). 
 
As much as he is careful to trust his own capacity to remember accurately, there are times 
when Ramos provides detailed descriptions of specific events without expressing much 
doubt. I have a sense that detailed accounts only seem reliable when their significance is 
clear, i.e. when we understand why he would remember this episode so specifically, as it is 
the case with self-defining memories. Why could that be?  
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 One possible explanation is that detailed recollection is often associated with emotion. 
Conway (1990, p. 92) cites studies which indicate that "intensity of emotional reaction and 
degree of life impact [are] positively correlated with memory vividness".  
 An example of this is the chapter entitled "Um cinturão" (p. 45),47 in which he 
describes events that admitteldly made a deep impression on him. This specific episode 
contains various elements which agree with the way we construct self-defining memories 
(characterized by vividness, affective intensity, high levels of rehearsal, linkage to similar 
memories and connection to an enduring concern, ref. section 4.2). 
 Starting with the first characteristic of SDMs: affective intensity. Besides recalling his 
emotional responses the what happened, Ramos emphasizes the fact that he is still moved by 
the memory of that episode: "Achava-me num deserto. A casa escura, triste; as pessoas 
tristes. Penso com horror nesse êrmo, recordo-me de cemitérios e de ruínas mal-
assombradas" (p. 48).48 He also notes that "Hoje não posso ouvir uma pessoa falar alto. O 
coração bate-me forte, desanima, como se fosse parar, uma cólera doida agita coisas 
adormecidas cá dentro" (p. 47).49  
 Some emotional responses are remembered or inferred, such as "Sei que estava 
bastante zangado, e isto me trouxe a covardia habitual" (p. 46)50, and "O assombro gelava-me 
o sangue, escancarava-me os olhos" (p. 47).51 There are also a number of sensory details that 
contribute to the vividness of the memory: "... vi meu pai dirigir-se à rêde, afastar as 
varandas, sentar-se e logo se levantar, agarrando uma tira de sola, o maldito cinturão, a que 
desprendera a fivela quando se deitara. Resmungou e entrou a passear agitado" (p. 49)52; 
although the author admits that much is unclear: "Não consigo reproduzir tôda a cena. 
Juntando vagas lembranças dela a fatos que se deram depois, imagino os berros de meu pai, a 
zanga terrível, a minha tremura infeliz" (p. 47).53                                                         47 "A broad belt" (p. 36) 48 "I found myself in a desert. The house was dark, sad; the people were sad. I think with horror of this waste land, and I remember cemeteries and haunted ruins" (p. 38) 49 "Today I cannot bear to hear anybody talking loudly. My heart beats fast, so discouraged that it wants to stop, my voice sticks, my sight grows dim, a strange anger stirs up dormant things inside me." (ibid.) 50 "I know that he was quite angry, and this caused my habitual cowardice" (p. 37) 51 "Fear froze my blood, my eyes were wide open" (ibid.) 52 ... I saw my father walking towards the hammock, moving away from the [veranda], sitting down, getting up right away, grabbing a leather strap, the damned broad belt, from which the buckle came loose when he flung it down. He muttered and came back in the house restlessly" (p. 39) 53 "I can't reproduce all this scene. Joining vague memories from it to facts that occurred afterwards, I imagine my father's shouts, his terrible anger, and my unhappy trembling" (p. 37) 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 Also important is how Ramos recalls other similar memories, thereby reinforcing the 
idea that the conflicts with his parents may represent what Blagov and Singer would 
characterize as enduring concerns or unresolved conflicts: "Situações dêste gênero 
constituíram as maiores torturas da minha infância, e as consequências delas me 
acompanharam" (p. 47)54, Ramos writes.  
 
5.4 An autobiographical novel? 
Some elements in the text might be interpreted as signs of a literary treatment which draws 
more from imagination than pure recall. For instance, when the author "remembers" a 
complete sentence uttered by a nameless man when he was very young: "Um deles perguntou 
como se havia de assar o bacalhau e outro respondeu: — Faz-se um grajau de madeira" (p. 
25).55 Or when he reproduces an entire dialogue, as he does in the chapter entitled "D. 
Maria". Here is a short excerpt: 
 — Leia. 
 — Não senhora, respondí confuso.  
 Ainda não havia estudado as letras finas, menores que as da carta de A B C. Necessário que 
me esclarecessem as dificuldades. 
 D. Maria resolveu esclarecê-las, mas parou logo, deixou-me andar só no caminho 
desconhecido. (...) O exercício prolongou-se e arrisquei a perguntar até onde era a lição. 
 — Está cansado? sussurrou a mulher. 
 — Não senhora. 
 — Então vamos para diante. (p. 132)56 
 
Neisser (1981, p. 104) has dealt with the issue: "Verbatim recall", meaning word-for-word 
reproduction, he writes, "is not something we expect of ourselves in everyday life". On the 
other hand, memory for the "gist" of a conversation, i.e. recalling the sense of what has been 
said in different words, can obviously occur.  
 Coe (1984, p. 1) has aptly noted that while the telling of memories from adulthood 
relies on  a "common code" of understanding between the adult reader, the adult writer and 
the adult narrator, the "former self-as-child is an alien to the adult writer as to the adult                                                         54 "Situations of this kind composed the main torments of my childhood, and their consequences followed me" (p. 37) 55 "One of them asked how to bake codfish and the other answered: 'You should make a wooden rack'" (p. 22) 56 'Read.'       'No, ma'am,' I replied confusedly.       I hadn't yet studied the fine letters, smaller than those of the ABC pamphlet. The difficulties had to be clarified.       Dona Maria decided to explain them, but soon she stopped  and left me to wander the unknown way by myself. (...) The exercise was prolonged and I dared to ask her how far the lesson went.       'Are you tired?' murmured the woman.       'No, ma'am.'       'So let's go on.' (p. 88) 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reader". Hence the author is forced to create a convincing, yet alternative world for this 
childhood reality in writing.  
 Indeed, some of the fictional "feel" in Infância lies in passages where Ramos writes 
from the perspective of the young Graciliano. Here are two examples, also from the chapter 
"D. Maria": "Isto pareceu-me desarrazoado: exigiam de mim trabalho inútil. Mas obedeci. 
Obedeci realmente com satisfação"57 and "Agora, livre das emanações ásperas, eu me 
tranqüilizava. Mas não estava bem tranqüilo ... Dominava os receios e a tremura, desejava 
findar a obrigação antes que estalasse a cólera da professôra" (p. 133).58 Another one can be 
found on page 140: "Forma de perguntar esquisita, pensei".59  
 He also sometimes takes the perspective of other people, which contributes, I think, to 
giving parts of the text the air of fiction. For example in "Vendo-me o desembaraço, minha 
mãe tentou agarrar-me" (p. 56).60 And here is another example with his mother: "Minha mãe 
estranhou a manifestação rebelde, tentou provar-me que os doutôres conheciam as 
trapalhadas do céu e adivinhavam as consequências delas. Mas queria certificar-se de que se 
enganava, pelo menos na parte relativa ao enorme incêndio" (p. 89).61 
 
The aforementioned examples are not, in my opinion, the sort of thing that would make the 
work lose its autobiographical "feel"—at least not when it appears sporadically, and is not 
presented as a prolonged dialogue.  
 As Smith and Watson (2010, p. 37) point out, "we allow that memories, and the 
experience made out of memories, can be inconsistent (as they are in much life writing), 
probably because we experience our own as inconsistent". A celebrated author of novels, it is 
almost expected that Ramos would handle the task of writing his childhood autobiography 
much like fictional prose; not necessarily because he didn't mind falsifying memories, but 
perhaps because in his attempt to put his memories into words, he chose the form he was 
most comfortable with.  
 The question the reader probably asks him/herself in this case is not whether people                                                         57 "This seemed to me unreasonable: they demanded useless work from me. But I obeyed. I really obeyed with satisfacton" (p. 88) 58 "Now, free from harsh exhalations, I was at ease. But not altogether ... I overcame my fear and trembling, I wanted to end the task before the teacher's anger broke" (p. 89). 59 "A peculiar way of asking, I thought" (p. 93) 60 "Seeing me so completely at ease, my mother attempted to hold me" (p. 42) 61 "My mother found my unruly demonstration rather strange; she tried to prove to me that the sages knew about the complications of heaven and divined their consequences. But she wanted to be sure that she had not made a mistake, at least in the part dealing with the great fire" (p. 63) 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really uttered those lines or whether the little boy actually had those thoughts, but whether 
Ramos remembers things this way, or if he made it up. In my mind, this process of 
questioning the authenticity of the autobiographical text does not invalidate it, but rather 
confirms its referential nature. It indirectly implies an acceptance of a "model", to use 
Lejeune's term (1973, p. 317); something "real" that the utterance claims to resemble, a 
world-beyond-the-text. The process of verification that goes on in my mind as I read Ramos' 
text, implies that I take for granted that it is based on the author's memories of events he 
experienced and is now able to recall.  
 Even if I did not know the text was written by Graciliano Ramos or if there was no 
autobiographical pact established here, would I still recognize the possibility of it being 
something other than fiction? The answer is yes, and I suspect I am not the only one who 
would think so. I believe it is because, just as elements such as dialogue and "mind-reading" 
sometimes make us wonder whether the author is telling the truth about his memories, other 
elements echo the way we build and retrieve our own memories for past events and the way 
we structure our own life stories.  
 
5.5 Notes on the reception of Infância 
In an essay about Ramos' fiction and non-fiction, renowned Brazilian critic and scholar 
Antonio Candido (who actually knew Ramos personally) writes about Infância as a book in 
which the author directly approaches his own experiences.  
 Although the essay was re-published in 2006, it was first written in 1955. At the time, 
many Brazilian literary critics had adopted the view of the literary text as an autonomous 
object which was to be judged intrinsically. Candido still recognized, however, that there was 
something about the author that excited the curiosity of the reader. He thought this was due to 
the fact that a novel could only give rise to an immediate interest, which was confined to the 
limits of that one work of fiction. A body of work, however, would inevitably lead us to 
investigate the reality behind it and "as características do homem a quem devemos esse 
sistema de emoções e fatos tecidos pela imaginação" (Candido, 2006, p. 69).62 
  Candido does not rule out that Infância may be read as a novel. He thinks that the 
people that Ramos describes in the book appear to be characters and that the author 
approaches them as literary creations (unfortunately, he does not explain this point in depth).                                                         62 "the characteristics of the man to whom we owe this system of emotions and facts woven by the imagination" 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Candido admits that all autobiography will inevitably contain doses of fiction, but he defends 
the idea that, in an autobiographical text, a reader will still feel "um certo esqueleto de 
realidade escorando os arrancos  da fantasia" (ibid., p. 70).63 This "scaffold", this framework, 
would be what separates the autobiography from the novel. Infância is for Candido an 
"autobiografia tratada literariamente" (ibid., p. 90)64, and he senses in it an author's desire to 
give it the form of a novel.   
 Candido sees in Ramos' body of work a clear path that, apparently by necessity, led 
him from fiction to non-fiction: "à medida que os livros passam, vai se acentuando a 
necessidade de abastecer a imaginação no arsenal da memória, a ponto de o autor, a certa 
altura, largar de todo a ficção em prol das recordações, que a vinham invadindo de maneira 
imperiosa" (ibid., p. 102).65  
 When analyzing Angústia, one of Ramos' novels, Candido felt it was relevant to ask 
how much of the author himself one could find in Luís da Silva, the character. It is interesting 
to me how he justifies his own need to pose this question: there is less direct dialogue in 
Angústia than in Ramos' earlier fiction, the book is more monological (ref. what was said 
about dialogue in the previous section). He compares Luís da Silva to the young Graciliano 
from Infância: "...nota-se que sua meninice é, pouco mais ou menos, a narrada em Infância. 
Só que reduzida a elementos da etapa anterior aos dez anos, quando morou na fazenda, à 
sombra do avô materno (aqui, paterno), e na vila Buíque" (ibid., p. 58).66 
 Candido goes on to conclude that Luís is a character built on autobiographical 
premises, and refers to Angústia as "autobiografia potencial".67 These autobiographical 
premises, however, seem to have taken a turn during the creative process, resulting in this 
other person, the character, "no qual só pela análise baseada nos dois livros autobiográficos 
podemos discernir virtualidades do autor".68  
 The comparison of the character in Angústia to the author which we get to know                                                         63 "a certain scaffold of reality supporting the outbursts of fantasy" 64 "autobiography dealt with in a literary manner" 65 "as books are written down, the need to fuel the imagination in the arsenal of memory gets more accute, so that the author, at a certain point, abandons all fiction in favor of his or her memories, which have been plaguing that fiction in a commanding fashion" 66 " ... we note that his boyhood is more or less the one described in Infância, even though it is reduced to the stage before he was ten years old, when he lived at the farm, protected by his grand‐father from his mother's side (here, from his father's side), and in Buíque" 67 "potential autobiography" 68 "in whom, only by analyzing these two autobiographical books we can  figure some of the author's essential nature" 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through Infância, presupposes that Candido, like most readers, distinguishes between the 
narration of imagined events and of events that are brought forth by memory. Whether 
Candido actually compares two constructions—two characters if you will—, he still supposes 
that one of them is the person within Graciliano Ramos' body, while the other is someone 
created by the person within Graciliano Ramos' body. These two selves are clearly not at the 
same level, neither in the mind of readers like Candido nor of authors like Ramos: Ramos 
experienced himself as a person with an identity and a life story and thought therefore that he 
could write an autobiography. Candido also experiences his self in the same way, and I 
suppose this is why he thinks that Ramos did write an autobiography.   
 
Silva (2004) deals with the reception of Infância by Brazilian critics. She attributes its status 
as an autobiographical narrative to the autobiographical pact: "Talvez as três categorias 
indicadas na Coleção — Memórias, Diários e Confissões — induzissem a crítica, de início, a 
'ler' o livro  segundo uma das três possibilidades" (ibid., p. 32).69 Not many of the critics 
mentioned by Silva deem Infância to be purely fictional, but most of them acknowledge that 
there is an inevitable difference between what is lived and remembered and what an author is 
able to express in written form.  
 In analyzing Edmund Gosse's Father and Son, Mandel (1980, p. 61) says that in the 
act of reading, we never forget Gosse is "speaking to us directly about what happened long 
ago. He is always there, telling his story". I notice this in Silva's reading as well; she refers to 
Infância as a novel (ibid., p. 27), but can not help to feel the presence of the author in the text 
and to treat it as non-fiction: 
Em outra passagem, buscando recordar um antigo verão, que muito lhe marcara a vida de menino, o 
autor demonstra realizar grande esforço para reunir os pequenos quadros dispersos, visto que ora se 
apresentam de forma nítida, ora constituem-se em profundos lapsos e omissões (ibid., p. 38).70  
I mentioned earlier that Antonio Candido saw a kind of progression in Ramos' work from 
fiction to non-fiction. Angústia is the novel in which he thinks we see most clearly some of 
the traits from the boy we would later meet in Infância, which was published almost ten years 
later: "a um livro cheio de elementos tomados à experiência de menino (Angústia) sucede 
outro, de recordações, é verdade, mas apresentadas com tonalidade ficcional (Infância)"                                                         69 "Maybe the three categories indicated in that Collection ‐ Memories, Diaries, and Confessions ‐ have induced some citics, from the start, to "read" the book according to one of those three possibilities." 70 "In another passage, trying to remember a remarkable old Summer of his childhood days, the author reveals the he is struggling to get together al those scattered frames, since they sometimes present themselves clearly and sometimes get deeply slipped and ommited." 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(Candido, 2006, p. 102).71 There was a shift, Candido argues, in Ramos' "atitude literária"72 
throughout the years: from a need to create something imaginatively to a need, in his words, 
to testify.  
 Brown (in Ramos, 1979, p. 12) also mentions Angústia as the novel in which Ramos 
"more boldly than before used characters and scenes from his own life", noting also that 
many of these appear in Infância.73 Emphasizing the book's historical importance, Brown 
writes that Infância is "the best account that we have of the North-east of Brazil in the 1890s" 
(ibid., p. 15) and praises Ramos' abilities as a writer: 
Always extremely honest as a writer, Ramos has ... drawn directly on his own experience for his 
fiction. Childhood is a memoir written like a novel, episodic in structure but beautiful in its cumulative 
force and 'felt life', and perhaps he has here the form most congenial to his nature (ibid., p. 17). 
 
Octávio de Faria, who writes the preface to the seventh edition of Infância in Portuguese, 
focuses instead on how the autobiography provides biographical information about the 
author.  
 Citing a passage from the book, he writes that "vemos surgir, através do miúdo e 
desconfiado menino Graciliano todo o futuro vulto literário do grande e modesto, precavido e 
lúcido, extraordinário Graciliano Ramos" (in Ramos, 1969, p. 8)74; and finds the key to 
understanding Ramos' literary style in the past described in his autobiography: "... eis 
também, e em síntese, o caminho literário do ficcionista cujas raízes brotaram da infância de 
Infância para atingir a esplêndida floração de S. Bernardo e Angústia, de Vidas Secas e 
Insônia" (ibid., p. 13).75  
 Likewise, Candido thought that Ramos' two autobiographical works (the second is 
Memórias do Cárcere76) helped the reader understand his novels, "pois não apenas revelam 
certas características pessoais transpostas ao romance, como esclarecem o modo de ser do 




The readings of Candido, Brown, Faria and Silva all concord with what I mentioned earlier 
about the sense that even with the "literary treatment" in Infância, readers are still open to the 
possibility of it being an autobiography, something other than fiction.  
 Lejeune (1973, p. 299) has pointed out that "[a]ll identity is, or is not. It is impossible 
to speak of degrees".  Similarly, I think we all have a sense of being a self with memories 
that are ours, that refer to ourselves and our experiences. Written texts might be referential to 
an author's own experience to varying degrees. In section 2.1, I quoted Eakin as saying that 
"the most successful attempts to date to establish a poetics of the genre ... focus precisely on 
the reader's recognition of a referential intention in such texts". As readers, even when we are 
not able to verify the truth of a text, we will still have some sense of whether we are dealing 
with the written narrative of someone's life. We do that to a large extent, I believe, by 
assessing congruence with  how we experience memory and the life story, seeking the roots 
of referentiality in the author's self by way of our own self.  
 This is perhaps part of why we find it difficult to say that all forms of autobiography 
are, in the end, only fiction. It makes sense in many levels, but ultimately it goes against our 
sense of being a self with an identity, memories and a life story. 
5.6 A neurobiological pact 
I mentioned in the introduction that I viewed Lejeune's autobiographical pact as more of an 
invitation to draw boundaries between the fictional and the non-fictional in the text. This is in 
agreement with what Lejeune himself (1973, p. 308) writes about it:  
... the importance of the contract is that it actually determines the attitude of the reader: if the identity is 
not stated positively (as in fiction), the reader will attempt to establish resemblances, in spite of the 
author; if it is positively stated (as in autobiography), the reader will want to look for differences 
(errors, deformations, etc.) 
Lejeune's autobiographical pact may seem simplistic, but there is more often than not no 
other way for us to know if someone's childhood memories are "true"—not even the person 
having the memories, as I have attempted to show in chapter 4. In many cases, the pact is all 
we have. But what if someone handed you a text without telling you who the author was or 
whether it was fictional or autobiographical? Take for instance cases that Lejeune (ibid., pp. 
310-311) describes as Name of the protagonist = 0 and Pact = 0, meaning that the protagonist                                                         77 "because they not only unveil certain personal traits transposed into fiction, but they also illuminate the writer's personality, allowing us to better interpret his own literary attitude" 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does not have a name and the author "does not conclude any pact, neither autobiographical 
nor fictional". Leujeune's example is Mother and Child, by Charles-Louis Philippe. I argue 
that we use our own experience of being a self with a set of memories and a "life story" to get 
a sense of whether a given text is autobiographical or fictional; we identify or not with the 
way they are built.  
 
In terms of content, our life stories can infinitely vary, but as the studies of Conway, Pleydell-
Pearce, McAdams and many others have shown, the way our life stories are built and 
organized may actually be something most of us share, especially those in the same cultural 
group.78 I am not suggesting that all autobiographies follow the same structure, as that would 
require a different kind of analysis with a different degree of empirical evidence, but there are 
certain similarities in the way our minds deal with memories and how these memories are 
organized in order to form the more coherent whole which we call identity. 
 If an author was, for instance, to write a novel which emulates a proper 
autobiography, my guess is that most readers would be open to the possibility that they could 
be reading an autobiographical text until they were given reason to think otherwise, for 
instance because of the difference of name between author and narrator/protagonist (ref. ibid., 
p. 309).  
 Coe (1984, p. 3) interestingly points out that in the eighteenth century, "when the 
novel was striving to free itself from the imputation of vain fantasy and improbable 
romance", authors frequently tried to emulate the form of autobiography. By contrast, 
twentieth century writers tended more often to "entitle [their] work a novel when, most 
palpably, it is in every significant aspect based on his own lived and remembered 
experience". 
 Furthermore, the idea that an autobiographical text is only one version of a person, a 
life or a life event—"No autobiography is completed, only ended", as Bruner (2002, p. 8) 
writes—does not affect my hypothesis. We still distinguish, I believe, between the story of a 
person's life and the story of an imagined person's life. When I say "distinguish", I don't mean 
we are always able to tell what is what when reading a given text. I mean we have a feeling in 
our minds of what we have experienced ourselves and what we have not (or are not sure we 
have).                                                          78 Part of what is needed to built a life story, such as a sense continuity over time and a sense of self, are innate to all humans,  as Bruner  (2002) points out, but a big part of  self‐making  is,  of  course,  influenced by  culture. Leichtman, Wang  and  Pillemer  (2003),  for  example,  write  about  differences  in  the  content  and  style  of  autobiographical memories of people from different cultures. 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 Thus, a point made in passing by Brewer (1996, p. 38) acquires relevance within my 
framework of thought: "In the same way that people have knowledge about phenomena in the 
external world, they have beliefs about the operation of their own mental processes." From 
that I take that we use what we know about how our autobiographical memory works, as an 
indication of how other people's autobiographical memory works. Accordingly, we also have 
beliefs about how much and how accurately some things can be remembered. That is why I 
think we read autobiography with a certain openness to the possibility that the author could 
manage to express his/her autobiographical memories and life narrative; because in our 
minds the life narrative and the remembered past feel very "real". I assume we use this 
knowledge when judging whether authors' accounts of their personal past appear reliable or 
not. Nonetheless, the extent of mental intention79 behind autobiographical narratives, is 
another discussion.  
 This is where Philippe Lejeune's autobiographical pact proves relevant: because 
ultimately readers want confirmation of whether they should approach the text as fiction or 
non-fiction. That does not mean, however, that they will not have an instinctive idea, a 
"hunch" if you will, about what sort of text they are dealing with.  
 
As part of his attempt to see beyond truth versus fiction in autobiography, Lejeune also asks 
himself how a text can resemble a life.  
 As a genre, autobiography is often compared to the novel. Some have argued that the 
latter is indeed "truer", such as author André Gide: "Memoirs are never more than half 
sincere, however great the concern for truth may be; everything is always more complicated 
than we say it is. Perhaps we even come closer to the truth in the novel" (in Lejeune 1973, p. 
321). Such comparisons, Lejeune notes, only confirm that there indeed exists a so-called 
"autobiographical space" in which texts are read, because autobiography is in fact used as a 
criterion for comparison: 
If the novel is truer than autobiography, why are Gide, Mauriac and many others not happy with 
writing novels? ... if they had not also written and published autobiographical texts, even "inadequate" 
ones, no one would ever have seen the nature of the truth that it was necessary to look for in their 
novels (ibid., pp. 321-322). 
At the core of Lejeune's theory is the idea that autobiography is a contractual genre, and he 
introduces different kinds of "pacts" between reader and author: the most famous                                                         79  I  use  the  term  "mental  intention"  in  the  philosophical  sense.  As  Brewer  (1996,  p.  29)  notes,  a  number  of philosophers have suggested that "memory is distinguished from imagination by the individual's awareness that they are intending to recollect in one case and are intending to imagine something in the other case". 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autobiographical pact, the fictional pact, the referential pact, et cetera.  
 Like Lejeune, I explore the "positions of the author and reader" (ibid., p. 323) more 
than the structures of the text — although I also argue that ultimately (beyond their 
acceptance of the possibility of autobiography), readers will have to base their judgement on 
texts they read. The point of this chapter has been to show that some of the elements in a text 
might trigger a sense of congruence in most readers, because they evoke the inherently 
human experience of being a continuous self in time with a set of autobiographical memories 
which we feel are ours. In this regard, one can perhaps also speak of a "neurobiological pact".  
 While the autobiographical pact signals to the reader what kind of premises to build 
their reading upon, on a different level the neurobiological pact allows the reader to 
distinguish between fictional and non-fictional elements based on congruence — regardless 





6 Thinking beyond the truth concept 
 
As I have sought to show, autobiography as a literary genre is still very much under scrutiny. 
One of the most problematic issues attached to the genre is our inability to place it in the 
category of fiction or non-fiction. Drawing on Lejeune's theory of the autobiographical pact 
(ref. section 2.2), Lynch (2010, p. 210) writes about "autobiography's central identity crisis as 
it moves constantly between fact and fiction". Like other contemporary autobiography critics 
(such as Eakin, Smith and Watson and Olney, to mention a few), Lynch is adamant about 
autobiography being a fiction ("Autobiography is a 'fiction', certainly", she writes), but at the 
same time she concedes that it is "not classifiable as a form of fiction in the way that novels 
or short stories are" (ibid., p. 213).  
 During most of the twentieth century, autobiography was seen as essentially a 
literature of fact, different from the imaginative kind. In the 1970's and 1980's, however, 
autobiography began to be seen as a distinctive literary discourse, "indeed, some argued, one 
of the discourses of fiction" (Eakin, 2001, p. 124; ref. also sections 3.5 and 4.5).  
 In in his influencial essay from 1980, James Olney wrote about the naïve assumptions 
that reigned in the field of autobiography before the shift of focus from bios to autos, such as 
that it was possible for an individual to narrate his or her own life story unproblematically. 
Influenced by post-structuralist theories, Olney (1980, p. 22) contends that in written 
autobiographical narratives, "neither the autos nor the bios is there in the beginning, a 
complete entity, a defined, known self or history to be had for taking".  
 Decades later, there still seems to be difficult to acknowledge autobiography as a non-
fictional genre (or a singular genre). Smith and Watson (2010, p. 9), for instance, think that 
calling life writing non-fiction "confuses rather than resolves the issue" (so does calling it 
fiction!).   
 Citing Mary Evans, Lynch writes that autobiography's "place on the library shelves is 
not with non-fiction but very much closer to fiction" (in Lynch, 2010, p. 216) and that the 
genre needs reclassification. All things considered, Lynch suggests that autobiography is a 
"trans-genre" type of writing, located between multiple genres, while Smith and Watson 
(2010, p. 4) do not even want to use the term autobiography, but instead argue that the terms 
"life writing" and "life narrative" are more inclusive of the heterogeneity of self-referential 
practices. Although I certainly understand why the clear-cut distinction between fiction and 
non-fiction as literary categories has been and should be scrutinized, I have doubts as to how 
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productive it is, in the case of autobiography, to simply say that it can not be placed in either 
one of the two categories. The inability to characterize autobiography as either fiction or non-
fiction, almost makes the two categories useless for any kind of literature, since, as Mandel 
(1980, p. 53) reminds us, "[a]ll genres readily borrow from other genres and modes". Of 
course, one might also choose to defend the idea, like Mandel does, that the fiction/non-
fiction dichotomy is altogether false, but where does that leave us?   Karl Ove Knausgård and his Min Kamp is a fitting and recent example of a work of 
literature that has had critics and readers alike discussing, among other things, the boundaries 
between fact and fiction. Writing about the book, Danish professor and critic Poul Behrendt 
(2011) says Knausgård's opus is neither an autobiography nor a novel, but something else 
entirely.80 Without digressing too much, I will insist that "[t]he unicorn does not invalidate 
the horse", to borrow an expression from Mandel (1980, p. 62). In my view, experiments 
such as Knausgård's, though very interesting in terms of the discussions they generate, do not 
change the neurobiological fact that we experience things that we believe happened to us 
differently than things we intentionally imagine.  
 Like Damasio (1999, p. 185) says, "concepts precede words and sentences" in 
evolution and daily experience. "When we say 'I' or 'me'", he explains, "[the mind] is 
translating, easily and effortlessly, the non-language concept of the organism that is mine" 
(ibid.). Why do we keep discussing the (im)possibility of fiction or non-fiction, while still 
employing the same terms? Whatever we choose to call these categories, or even if we try to 
do away with them entirely, my point is that we will still be left with a non-verbal concept 
that life stories are possible (because we have them ourselves) and that they are something 
different from stories we invent; stories which in our minds we do not feel ownership and 
agency towards. "You know you exist because the narrative exhibits you as protagonist in the 
act of knowing", as Damasio writes (1999, p. 172; ref. also chapter 3); and this is the very 
basis of consciousness: "the very confection of you as an observer or knower of the things 
observed, of you as owner of thoughts that formed in your perspective, of you as potential 
agent on the scene" (ibid., p. 127).  
 When critics say things like that the "first person" is only naïvely conceived as being 
outside language (Lejeune, 1973, p. 314) or that the coherent self and the unified story are 
mere myths (Smith and Watson, 2010, p. 61), I think they are not taking enough in 
                                                        80 "...i denne prosa, der hverken er selvbiografi eller roman, men noget helt og holdent tredje" 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consideration a large body of neuroscientific and psychological research (some of which I 
have outlines in chapters 3 and 4).  
 I find it relevant to go back to Barrett J. Mandel and his explanation of why 
autobiography is not fiction:  
Of course it is true that autobiographers use tecniques of fiction, but such usage does not turn an 
autobiography into a fiction any more than Dvořák's use of folk motifs turn the New World Symphony 
into a folk song. At every moment of any true autobiography (I do not speak here of autobiographical 
novels) the author's intention is to convey the sense that "this happened to me", and it is this intention 
that is always carried through in a way which, I believe, makes the result different from fiction. 
(Mandel, 1980, p. 53) 
I get a sense that Mandel was referring, at least in this passage, to more or less intentional 
"embellishments" of the truth in literary forms of autobiographical writing when he writes 
that autobiographers use "techniques of fiction", while more recent criticism is based on the 
"myths of identity" that Smith and Watson outline (ref. section 3.5). In other words, 
contemporary critics are not only talking about intentional distortions of the truth by authors 
of autobiography, but of the downright impossibility of not reconstructing (and hence 
falsifying) experience in life writing. At the same time, Mandel brings to our attention an 
important aspect that Damasio many years later reminds us of, namely that in 
autobiographical recollection there is a sense that "this happened to me". 
 As a starting point to what I've been proposing here, is the idea that even though we 
all know that our memories are not always true and that many fictional narratives are based 
on real experiences, the distinction between fiction and non-fiction is so fundamental that I 
wonder if we still aren't caught in that "revolving door" that Paul de Man spoke of more than 
thirty years ago (de Man, 1979, p. 921). To me it seems like the zone between fiction and 
non-fiction is not a third level of referentiality, it is more like a grey zone to which we return 
whenever we can not tell if something is either-or—as is the case with a person's account of 
his or her childhood memories. Yes, there is good reason to say that the self is an illusion. 
And, yes, most of us understand that writing about past experience will never be a 
straightforward projection of experience itself. But why do we nonetheless accept 
autobiography as a possibility and refuse to equate it with something imagined, something 
fictional? As Eakin (1992, p. 27) has asked before me, "Why ... does autobiography as a kind 
of reading and writing continue and even prosper? Why do we not simply collapse 
autobiography into the other literatures of fiction and have done with it?"    At the risk of sounding simplistic, I would like to take a stand and suggest that 
autobiography as a literary genre is intrinsically non-fictional, because its main reference 
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point is a mental reality, which is the author's remembered past and his/her life story. With a 
novel, however, the main reference point is an intentionally imagined reality. This is not to 
say that one can not contain elements of the other. All genres, as I pointed out earlier, contain 
fictional and non-fictional elements. The main distinction, however, is that, in the minds of 
the author and that of the reader, there is a clear distinction between what is the experience of 
the self (or what they feel is the experience of the self) and what is not: 
You are busily all over the place and at many epochs of your life, past and future. But you—the me in 
you, that is—never drops out of sight. All of these contents are inextricably tied to a singular reference. 
Even as you concentrate on some remote event, the connection remains. The center holds. (Damasio, 
2010, p. 168) 
Whether this experience corresponds to a historical and verifiable reality is a whole other 
issue, which is by no means to say that it shouldn't be a topic of discussion in 
autobiographical studies on a case-to-case basis. Sometimes establishing accuracy can be 
important. As Smith and Watson (2010, p. 221) note, for instance, "questions of ethical 
representation are at the heart of autobiographical studies". The question that I personally 
have found more interesting to ask, however, is why do we even admit into our minds the 
idea that anyone could write retrospectively about his or her own existence and personality 
and why this would be different from creating an imagined story. 
 I hope I have been able to show why I think part of the answer may lie in how our 
minds build life stories with a "center of narrative gravity" which is the self. To quote Sacks: 
We have, each of us, a life-story, an inner narrative—whose continuity, whose sense, is our lives. It 
might be said that each of us constructs and lives, a 'narrative', and that this narrative is us, our 
identities. If we wish to know about a man, we ask 'what is his story—his real, innermost story?'—for 
each of us is a biography, a story. .....  Biologically, physiologically, we are not so different from each 
other; historically, as narratives—we are each of us unique. To be ourselves, we must have ourselves—
possess, if need be re-possess, our life-stories. We must 'recollect' ourselves, recollect the inner drama, 
the narrative, of ourselves. A man needs such a narrative, a continuous inner narrative, to maintain his 
identity, his self. (Sacks, 1987, pp. 110-111) 
Without a sense of self, we would not be able to form autobiographical memories, and 
without memories, we would not be able to construct life stories. As Searle (1998, p. 184) 
writes, "A sense of self is essential to memory because all of my memories are precisely 
mine. What makes them memories is that they are part of the structure that is part of my sense 
of self".  
 The fact that we each have a sense of having a unified self (and distinguish self from 
nonself) with a coherent life story (even though neurobiologically speaking this may be an 
illusion), I believe, is the reason why we can not completely let go of the idea that 
autobiography is possible and that it is distinguishable from fiction. Renza might have 
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(inadvertently) given us a clue to this when he wrote that "we have little difficulty 
recognizing and therefore reading autobiographies as opposed to works of fiction" (my 
italics; Renza, 1980, p. 216). We may seek to verify the facts in works labeled as 
autobiographies and find out that we have been victims of autobiographical hoaxes; as 
Gusdorf (1956, p. 89) says, autobiography is "unquestionably a document about a life, and 
the historian has a perfect right to check out its testimony and verify its accuracy". We may 
also read the autobiographies of authors who have had the intention of being truthful, but still 
know that in many ways autobiographies are "hopelessly inventive" (ref. section 2.3). But 
won't we always distinguish between the attempt to write about something experienced or 
something imagined because in our minds we make the same distinction?  
 In The Principles of Psychology, William James deals with the nature of the self and 
illustrates his point by means of an anecdote which I think is relevant.81  
When Paul and Peter wake up in the same bed, and recognize that they have been asleep, each one of 
them mentally reaches back and makes connection with but one of the two streams of thought which 
were broken by the sleeping hours. ... The past thought of Peter is appropriated by the present Peter 
alone. He may have a knowledge, and a correct one too, of what Paul's last drowsy states of mind were 
as he sank into sleep, but it is an entirely different sort of knowledge from that which he has of his own 
last states. He remembers his own states, whilst he only conceives Paul's. Remembrance is like direct 
feeling; its object is suffused with a warmth and intimacy to which no object of mere conception ever 
attains (James, 1890, pp. 238-239). 
Damasio makes a number of references to William James in his own texts, and I can imagine 
that this passage may also be related to Damasio's theories. When James writes about 
"warmth and intimacy", I presume he is referring to something which can be compared to 
Damasio's terms "ownership" and "perspective". The point is that, as James implies, our 
minds distinguish between self and others, between its own experiences and memories and 
imagined scenarios (ref. Damasio's thoughts in section 3.3).  
 Eakin approaches autobiography, like I am trying to do,  not only as a literary genre, 
but as a mental process of identity formation. "Written autobiographies", he says, "represent 
only a small if revealing part of a much larger phenomenon, the self-narration we practice 
day in day out" (Eakin, 2001, p. 114). In a more recent work, Eakin bases some of his ideas 
on Damasio's theories. He notes that "individual first-person perspective, ownership and 
agency—these primary attributes of core consciousness are also key features of the literary 
form of self, the 'I' of autobiographical discourse" (Eakin 2008, p. 71). What he does here is 
to establish a tight connection between the self that emerges in autobiographical writing and 
the biological self associated with a body:                                                          81 It is Eakin (1992, p. 7n6) who, in a footnote, brings my attention to this part of James' work. 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When we write autobiography and when we read it, we repeat in our imaginations the rhythms of 
identity experience that autobiographical narratives describe. I believe that the identity narrative 
impulse that autobiographies express is the same that we respond to every day in talking about 
ourselves; both may be grounded in the neurobiological rhythms of consciousness. (ibid., p. 79) 
For all his focus on the referential nature of autobiography, I still find Eakin somehow caught 
up in the "revolving door" (perhaps it is inevitable), as he claims that autobiography is "a 
discourse of fact and a discourse of fiction" (Eakin, 2001, p. 124, my italics). Fundamentally, 
however, he proposes that autobiography is a discourse of identity.  
 Hood explains that our sense of identity and of self is built through social interation, 
that we are shaped in part by memories that are not always reliable. The conclusion that 
follows is, naturally, that the self is "continually shifting and reshaping as the contexts 
change" (ibid., p. 293). 
 There is little to disagree concerning the fact that identity is, to a large extent, socially 
constructed and deeply influenced by culture, as well as by people around us. Still, I believe, 
as Eakin does, that one must not forget the roots of identity in our lives "in and as bodies" 
(Eakin, 2008, p. 153). Eakin suggests that there is a link between the self in its literary form 
and the self as a biological manifestation. Self-narration, composed of image-based 
sequences of brain events, allows for stability in our minds, giving us the "notion of a 
bounded, single individual that changes ever so gently across time but, somehow, seems to 
stay the same" (Damasio in ibid., p. 155).  
 This idea can be connected to a sentence I find in the last pages of Hood's (2012, p. 
294) work on self illusion: "It may be an illusion, but it is real as far as the brain is 
concerned" (my italics). If the self, biologically speaking, is indeed only "the culmination of 
a multitude of processes" (ibid., p. 233), and the story of our lives is something our brain 
spins for us, then autobiography (leaving hoaxes aside) might be the only genre which 
mirrors directly the process of self-construction.   
 As we have seen in the course of this paper, the self might appear mysterious and 
elusive, but it is there; not as a homunculus, as Damasio reminds us, but as a binding force 
that allows us to glue together our memories and experiences and to form a somewhat 
coherent whole.  
 When it comes to memories, we've seen that they can be deceiving, but when we have 
memories of events that have happened to us, in which we are the protagonists, these 
memories are the very pieces that constitute the puzzle of the self. Besides, as Thorne (1995, 
p. 160) remind us, "[a] memory that is part of the cognitive system is a powerful presence, a 
subjective if not necessarily intersubjective truth." 
76 
 
It is time, then, to repeat the questions I posed in section 2.4: what kind of truth and what 
kind of reality is autobiography referential to? And what keeps us from placing it for good in 
the same category as fiction? 
 One can spend an entire career discussing problems concerning the relation between 
what an autobiographer writes and to which extent this written narrative is loyal to events as 
they happened "there and then". One can also discuss whether it is at all possible to describe 
any experience through language without distorting it (or to which degree), how much we can 
actually remember and whether we can tell the difference between which of our memories 
are slightly modified reconstructions and which are products of imagination through and 
through. As neurobiological research suggests, however, story-telling is "something brains 
do, naturally and implicitly" (Damasio, 2010, p. 293). Based on the theories I have outlined 
in the previous chapters, I prefer to look at unity and coherence not as myths of identity, but 
as facts of identity. And autobiography, viewed as a "discourse of identity", is not a fictional 
narrative. I propose that the genre's non-fictional character can be found in its intrinsic 
connection to the self memory system; its sucker-bearing arms reach not outwards, towards a 
past that can neither be verified nor recovered, but to a past that my living body feels is mine. 
A distortion in the recall of past events is only a distortion if you compare it to the "original" 
experience. But when it becomes embedded in the individual's life story, a distortion may be 
a fiction of recall, but, I argue, it is still an autobiographical fact. I would like to reclaim the 
autobiographical 'I' that has been blown to pieces without naïvely denying the self illusion 
created in the brain, as well as to acknowledge the coherence and unity in narratives of 
identity (biological and literary) without forgetting that they may at times be precisely what 
leads to distortion. Misch's observations concerning the self in autobiography might not have 
been that far from recent accounts based on knowledge of neurobiology, such as Damasio's:  
We live in possession of ourselves, after the special manner of a being conscious of itself and capable 
of saying "I". To stand as an I, or, more exactly, as an "I"-saying person, over against other persons and 
living beings and the things around us implies that we are aware of our independent existence, we do 
not merely impart impulses and perform acts as things of elementary existence, but as living beings we 
have knowledge of our impulses and actions as our own (Misch, 1907, p. 67).  
Here lies also the answer to the last of the two aforementioned questions. I believe we "buy in  
to autobiography's retrospective illusion" (Eakin, 2008, p. 156) and never let go of seeing it 
as non-fiction because we recognize its resemblance to our own mode of shaping life stories 
and recalling memories. Although Olney does not reach the same conclusion as I do, he gives 
a hint of what I mean here when he writes (1980, p. 26) that the "reader of autobiographies ... 
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is a vicarious or a closet autobiographer, and ... he is able to participate fully if vicariously in 
the self-creation going on in autobiography".   
 Writing about self-invention in the mid-1980's, Eakin contends that "we may entertain 
the possibility that autobiography, like speech, could afford a medium in which for both the 
autobiographer and his or her reader the self might be apprehended in its living presence" 
(Eakin, 1985, p. 220). He quickly moderates his claim: "[t]his, of course, would be to assign 
to autobiography an ideal capacity for self-expression, and there is little likelihood of its 
realization in any particular instance". I think autobiography's non-fictional character can 
perhaps be found not on the life narrative of a self which language fails to express, if any self 
indeed exists; but rather in our shared feeling that this self with a life story exists and, as a 






In the introduction to his book Mind, philosopher John Searle declares that he will try to 
"solve and dissolve" some of the difficult problems in the study of mental phenomena. He 
adds that "once we do that, the subject, the philosophy of mind, does not end: it gets more 
interesting" (2004, p. 3). 
 I started working on this paper, not because I had any grandiose ambition to come up 
with an answer to the truth and genre definition quandaries that have been haunting the field 
of autobiography for decades. Like Searle, I simply thought that digging into complex, ever-
present questions by looking at new research in adjacent fields could result in an interesting 
discussion—even without reaching any definitive answers to the questions I posed in the 
introductory chapter. 
 A starting point for this thesis has been the fact that truth and referentiality have been 
tirelessly debated topics in the history of autobiography criticism. By focusing on some of the 
most recent theories I could find on the matter of self and memory, I did encounter research 
which supports the claim that the self is a highly malleable, elusive entity and that memories 
can be deceiving in more ways than we would like to imagine. But there also seems to be 
almost a consensus that even if the self is as an illusion, it is a very real presence in our minds 
and it is indeed unified and stable to some degree; if not on a neural level, at least in terms of 
how we experience it in consciousness. I've come to sympathize with the notion of the self as 
a center of narrative gravity (as explained in chapter 3.1), as well as with the idea that it is 
"through narrative that we create selfhood", as Bruner (2002, p. 13) notes.  More importantly, 
I have come to believe, like Damasio, that the self has deeper roots and that our life story 
actually starts as a wordless narrative. 
 As Damasio argues, the more advanced sense of self that we usually talk about when 
we talk about autobiography, may be only the tip of the iceberg. The narrative of the 
autobiographical self rests on top of a wordless narrative which occurs in core consciousness. 
And it is already in this wordless narrative that I, my mind's protagonist in its most 
elementary form, come into being: 
 
The portrayal in the nonverbal narrative simultaneously creates and reveals the protagonist, connects 
the actions being produced by the organism to that same protagonist, and, along with the feeling 
generated by engaging with the object, engenders a sense of ownership. (Damasio, 2010, p. 203)  
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It is based on this rudimentary sense of self that we are able to produce the well-defined 
protagonist which is our autobiographical self (Damasio, 2010, p. 204), with its own set of 
autobiographical memories, i.e. its own Self Memory System, as Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce have proposed (ref. section 4.1). And from these memories, a life story unravels.  
 
I wrote in chapter 2.4 that Graciliano Ramos was once asked whether he could tell a reporter 
a little bit about his childhood and he replied that he had already written everything he knew 
about it in his autobiography. Ramos understood, as we all do, that a literary treatment of the 
past is never an accurate portrayal of the "there and then" of past experience—and neither is 
memory. In Infância he admits time and time again that he knows his memories of those 
years might be deceiving, as we saw in chapter 5. In other words, even though he signals that 
the story of his childhood may to some extent have been constructed, it is still the story of his 
childhood; the first "chapters" of the life story he has constructed in his mind.  
 Whether or not Ramos accurately remembers his "primeiras relações com a justiça"82 
(Ramos, 1969, p. 45), in his mind he must have felt a sense of ownership towards that 
autobiographical memory and he was its protagonist. This memory is different from 
something imagined, different from his fiction. I assume that this is why he characterized this 
book as an autobiography and not as a novel. The things we read in Infância might not be 
completely referential to Ramos' past as it actually happened, but we have reason to believe 
that they could be largely referential to his life story and Self Memory System—and as such, 
this autobiographical narrative is something other than fiction. Here we are dealing, as I have 
suggested in the previous chapters, with a neurobiological form of referentiality and 
distinction between non-fiction and fiction.  
 My goal has thus been to show that in our minds, we all have a set of memories we 
feel are autobiographical, and these differ from things we consciously imagine (even though 
imagination is to a large extent built on memories of real experiences). We build our life 
stories upon a collection of autobiographical memories, and although parts of this story may 
have been construed by our brains, it is still not just a story, it is our life story. We have a 
sense of which events our self has been involved in and which ones it has not. This is why I 




 As readers, at any given moment, we may want to seek verification of what in a novel 
is actually non-fictional, or what in an autobiography is actually fictional. I suggest that we 
recognize the possibility of autobiography because in our minds we are always building our 
autobiographies, from birth to death, with every possible cognitive means at our disposal.  
 I hope I have managed to show why, in many respects, I disagree with Barthes' 
conclusion that the "subject is merely an effect of language" (in Eakin, 1992, p. 6), as well as 
with de Man's observation that "the distinction between fiction and autobiography is ... 
undecidable" (1979, p. 921). Eakin's work has been useful (as I mentioned in a previous 
section, he seems to be one of the few literary scholars interested in neuroscience). I have 
tried, however, to dig even deeper into Antonio Damasio's ideas, as well as to look at more 
recent theories and publications by, among others, Damasio, Bruce Hood, Sidonie Smith and 
Julia Watson. In addition, I have incorporated into my thesis other areas of study (which have 
been outlined in chapter 4; the Self Memory System and life story theory), and I have tried to 
take a more definite stand and use the aforementioned studies to show why I do not agree 
with the claim that autobiography should be viewed as a fictional genre (or something "in 
between"). 
 I would like to close with a quote from James Olney's Memory and Narrative: "For by 
whatever name we call the literature—autobiography, life-writing, periautography—there 
exists a particularly intriguing kind of writing to be considered for which any one of the 
terms mentioned might be a fair enough designation" (Olney 1998, p. xvi). This kind of 
writing, as Eakin notes (1992, p. 3), "is nothing if not a referential art". And, as trivial as it 
sounds, I think we should dig for the roots of referentiality not in the outside world, but inside 
our embodied brains. Autobiographies are not a lot like novels. Some novels are a lot like 
autobiographies. And autobiographies are a lot like the stories our brains create. Between the 
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